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Harmonizing the Affordable Care Act
with the Three Main National
Systems for Healthcare Quality
Improvement: The Tort, Licensure,
and Hospital Peer Review Hearing
Systems
Katharine Van Tassel†
INTRODUCTION
In 1999, an Institute of Medicine report revealed the
startling news that treatment errors in hospitals were the
cause of up to 98,000 deaths annually.1 In a recent 2012 update
on this situation, a Consumer Reports investigation concluded
that approximately 2.25 million people in the United States
will likely die from medical harm in the next decade.2 Thus, the
Institute of Medicine report and the follow-up Consumer
†
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Professor of Law, University of Akron School of Law. M.P.H., Harvard School of Public
Health; J.D., Case Western Reserve University School of Law; B.S.N. Case Western
Reserve University; Author contact information: kvantassel@post.harvard.edu.
1
INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 1
(Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000).
2
How Safe Is Your Hospital? Our New Ratings Find That Some Are Riskier than
Others, CONSUMER REPORTS (Aug. 2012), http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine/
2012/08/how-safe-is-your-hospital/index.htm. (“More than 2.25 million Americans will
probably die from medical harm this decade . . . . That’s like wiping out the entire
populations of North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Vermont. It’s a manmade disaster.”). In the
decade since the IOM Report was published, this situation has not improved. A new study
by the Department of Health and Human Services estimates that one in seven Medicare
patients (thirteen and a half percent) experience an adverse event each month in American
hospitals, and some 15,000 die every month as a result. Deborah Huso, Medical Errors Kill
15,000 Medicare Patients a Month, DR. HANSEN CHIROPRACTIC (Nov. 17, 2010),
http://drhansenchiropractic.com/blog/b_3884_medical_errors_kill_15000_medicare_patients__
month.html. This makes medical errors in hospitals one of the leading causes of death in
the nation. A recent Healthgrades study estimates that more than 230,000 hospital deaths
from 2007 to 2009 could have been prevented within the Medicare population alone. KRISTEN
REED & RICK MAY, HEALTHGRADES, THE THIRTEENTH ANNUAL HEALTHGRADES HOSPITAL
QUALITY IN AMERICA STUDY 2 (2010), available at http://www.healthgrades.com/business/img/
HealthGradesHospitalQualityInAmericaStudy2010.pdf.
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Reports investigation published over a decade later suggest
that the three main systems in the United States tasked with
improving the quality of patient care—the state medical
malpractice and licensure systems and the private hospital peer
review hearing system—are all failing at their missions.
A large and rapidly growing group of empirical studies
suggests that the current normative practice of custom-based
medicine in the United States may be partly to blame. Custombased medical practice can have a profoundly negative impact
on the quality and cost of healthcare. This is the same standard
that the three main U.S. quality improvement systems rely
upon to measure physician competence. The customary care (or
eminence-based) model of medical practice is based on
physician preference grounded in tradition, opinion, or clinical
experience and not on objective, scientific evidence.
The quality and cost problems with the customary care
model of medical practice have led to new national initiatives
to move the United States to a contemporary, evidence-based
model of medical practice. These initiatives have led to major
changes in government-provided healthcare. These changes
appear in the Veterans Administration (VA) Hospital System,
Medicare, and in the major new rules governing private
healthcare insurance sold over Health Benefit Exchanges
pursuant to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of
2010 (also known as the ACA or “Obama Care”). The evidencebased model of medical practice is grounded in empirical data
created by clinical outcomes and effectiveness research. This
empirical data can recommend the best treatment for a steadily
increasing number of clinical disorders. This use of evidencebased medical practice shows great promise for improving
quality of care while reducing its cost.3
This article addresses the question of whether the three
main systems for improving healthcare quality in the United
States are following the government’s lead by encouraging the
adoption of evidence-based medical practice. Unfortunately, the
short answer is no.
Reflecting an understanding of the benefits of evidencebased treatment choices, a minority of state tort systems have
3

Katharine A. Van Tassel, Hospital Peer Review Standards and Due
Process: Moving from Tort Doctrine Toward Contract Principles Based on Clinical
Practice Guidelines, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 1179, 1194-97 (2006); see also Ronen
Avraham, Private Regulation, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (2009) (advocating this same
use of CPGs by hospitals but adding a proposal of providing immunity from suit for
those who apply CPGs).
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stepped away from using customary care as the exclusive proxy
for quality of care in medical malpractice actions. These tort
systems are allowing the introduction of risk–benefit analysis
grounded in empirical science as evidence of what constitutes
reasonable care. Thus, this article argues that these minority state
tort systems are operating instrumentally to encourage the
transition away from custom-based medical practice and toward
evidence-based medical practice. By virtue of applying their own
state law, the state licensure systems of this minority group of
states will follow suit. On the other hand, the majority of state tort
systems continue to rely on customary care to measure quality,
with their licensure systems mirroring this choice. This means
that the ACA, and other federal programs such as Medicare, are
on a collision course with the majority of state tort and licensure
systems over the practice of evidence-based medicine.
The third major system for improving quality of care is
the private hospital peer review system. Private hospital peer
review is a self-policing system where physicians informally
evaluate each other and sanction those physicians who are
allegedly failing to provide quality patient care. This article
asserts that hospital peer review, like the tort and licensure
systems, encourages the perpetuation of custom-based
practices and undermines national efforts to improve the
quality and cost of healthcare through the practice of evidencebased treatment choices. However, the hospital peer review
system provides an even stronger disincentive to the adoption
of evidence-based medicine than the other quality systems
because the outcome of hospital peer review could be the loss of
a physician’s entire career.
Unfortunately, while the ACA has at least some
provisions addressing the need to make changes in the medical
malpractice and licensure systems to encourage the use of
evidence-based standards of care, the ACA completely ignores
the hospital peer review system. This article makes specific
suggestions for how to revise all three major systems so that
they can work in tandem with federal law to encourage
physicians to adopt the evidence-based model of medical practice
in order to improve healthcare quality, cost, and access.
This article starts by explaining the difference between
customary care treatment choices and evidence-based
treatment choices. Next, the article explains how customary
care can be poor quality care, how the customary treatment
choice of a particular region can be more related to geography
than to quality, and how customary treatment can be costly
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treatment. This article then outlines how federally provided
healthcare pursuant to the ACA, as well as Medicaid and the
VA Hospital System, have adopted evidence-based treatment
choices that show great promise for enhancing quality of care
while decreasing the cost of care. The article goes on to explain
how the three U.S. systems for improving quality of care—the
state medical malpractice and licensure systems, and the
private hospital peer review hearing system—are acting
instrumentally to thwart national efforts to move to modern,
evidence-based healthcare. This article accomplishes this by
citing empirical research and providing a working example of
how a physician risks medical malpractice liability, or the loss
of the ability to practice medicine entirely through hospital
peer review, by choosing the evidence-based treatment choice
rather than adhering to the customary treatment choice.
Finally, this article proposes specific solutions to this
disconnect between federally provided healthcare pursuant to
the ACA, Medicaid, and the VA Health System, and the other
three systems for improving health care quality, cost, and
access. These solutions involve both top-down and bottom-up
strategies. In the context of the tort and licensure systems, the
solution is top-down because it requires action on the part of
state legislatures or court systems. It is up to legislators or
judges to change the scope of the admissible evidence in medical
malpractice and licensure cases, either by statute or case law, to
allow risk–benefit analysis based on empirical evidence to
become admissible on the issue of the standard of care.
On the other hand, the solution is bottom-up when it
comes to hospital peer review. This article proposes that
hospital peer review be completely restructured through the
application of a blend of knowledge translation theory with
continuous quality improvement research. This blended
approach will put knowledge into action by integrating into
physician practice evidence-based treatment choices using
clinical practice guidelines. Relying on the paternalistic
libertarian theory developed by Professors Cass Sunstein and
Richard Thaler, this proposed system relies upon “gold
standard” clinical practice guidelines as the default treatment
choice, but then allows for individual physician choice in
deviating from this default choice if it is reasonable to do so.
This exception allows for the high level of scientific uncertainty
that exists currently when it comes to many medical
conditions, particularly in the realm of the treatment of
outliers. As the practice of evidence-based medicine (also
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known as population-based medicine or the treatment of
“norm”) grows through the greater understanding of optimal
treatment choices through big data techniques to establish
comparative
effectiveness—and
later
transitions
to
personalized medicine based on the treatment of individuals
according to their unique genetic profiles—the currently high
degree of scientific uncertainly will steadily diminish and
reduce the use of this exception.
I.

THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF CUSTOMARY CARE PRACTICES
ON THE QUALITY AND COST OF HEALTHCARE

A.

Evidence-Based Versus Custom-Based Care

As a general matter, customary care is care that would
customarily be given by other physicians under the same or
similar circumstances. Customary care is subjective and is
based on physician preference (grounded on tradition, opinion,
or clinical experience4) and not on objective, scientific evidence.
In contrast, the evidence-based model for medical practice is
grounded on empirical data created through the use of clinical
outcomes and effectiveness research. This empirical data can
recommend the best treatment for a steadily increasing
number of clinical disorders.
The practice of providing customary care (also referred
to by many as “eminence-based medicine”) is the normative
practice in the United States. Unfortunately, a steadily
growing group of studies demonstrates that many customary
treatment choices can have a negative impact on the quality of
care. Another large group of studies indicates that there is a wide
variation in custom for the same medical condition across the
country and that the choice of customary treatment can be related
more to geography than to quality. Finally, there are a rapidly
mounting number of studies that show the significant negative
impact of some customary care choices on the cost of healthcare.

4

See THE IOWA CONSORTIUM FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE RESEARCH & EVALUATION,
EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES: AN IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE FOR COMMUNITY-BASED
SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT AGENCIES 3 (2003), available at http://www.uiowa.edu/
~iowapic/files/EBP%20Guide%20-%20Revised%205-03.pdf (The Iowa Consortium for
Substance Abuse Research and Evaluation is based at the University of Iowa).
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These problems with customary care have, over time,
become well documented by the Dartmouth Atlas of Health
Care.5 The Dartmouth Atlas describes itself as follows:
For more than 20 years, the Dartmouth Atlas Project has
documented glaring variations in how medical resources are
distributed and used in the United States. The project uses
Medicare data to provide information and analysis about
national, regional, and local markets, as well as hospitals and
their affiliated physicians. This research has helped
policymakers, the media, health care analysts and others
improve their understanding of our health care system and
forms the foundation for many of the ongoing efforts to
improve health and health systems across America.6

In a special report issued by the Dartmouth Atlas
Project (DAP), three categories of customary care were
distinguished: failure to provide necessary care, preferencesensitive care, and supply-sensitive care.7 This article adds an
additional category: misuse of medical care.
The DAP defines the first category of customary care as
the failure to provide needed care.8 The failure to provide
needed, or necessary, care is referred to in this article as the
underuse of care. Examples of the types of customary care that
fall into the category of underuse of care are provided in Part
5

The Dartmouth Atlas of Healthcare, http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/ (last
visited Apr. 11, 2013) [hereinafter Dartmouth Atlas].
The Dartmouth Atlas Project (DAP) began in 1993 as a study of health care markets
in the United States, measuring variations in health care resources and their
utilization by both geographic areas. More recently, the research agenda has
expanded to reporting on the resources and utilization among patients at specific
hospitals. DAP research uses very large claims databases from the Medicare
program and other sources to define where Americans seek care, what kind of care
they receive, and to determine whether increasing investments in health care
resources and their use result in better health outcomes for Americans. The
Dartmouth Atlas is a product of the Center for the Evaluative Clinical Sciences at
Dartmouth Medical School.
Press Release, Geisel Sch. of Med. at Dartmouth, New Study Shows Need for a Major
Overhaul of How United States Manages Chronic Illness (May 16, 2006), available at
http://geiselmed.dartmouth.edu/news/2006_h1/16may2006_overhaul.shtml [hereinafter
Dartmouth Press Release].
6
Dartmouth Atlas, supra note 5.
7
ELLIOT S. FISHER ET AL., REGIONAL AND RACIAL VARIATION IN HEALTH
CARE AMONG MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES: A BRIEF REPORT OF THE DARTMOUTH ATLAS
PROJECT 24 (Kristen K. Bronner ed., 2008), available at http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/
downloads/reports/AF4Q_disparities_Dec2008.pdf.
8
Id. The DAP describes effective care as “consist[ing] of evidence-based
services such as HemoglobinA1c testing for diabetics. Variations in effective care reflect
failure to deliver needed care.”
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I.B. Also discussed in Part I.B is the second category of
customary care: the misuse of medical care. While underuse is
an omission error, misuse is the wrong choice of medical care
and therefore represents a commission error.
The third category of customary care is preferencesensitive care, which includes care for medical conditions for
which there are multiple treatment options, each with its own
benefits and trade-offs.9 The broad geographical variations in
the use of preference-sensitive customary care, referred to in
this article as an unwarranted variation in care, are set forth
in Part I.C.
The fourth category of customary care is supplysensitive care, which represents care for which the supply of a
specific resource (for example, the number of physicians,
hospital beds, or specialized testing equipment) heavily
influences the customary amount of care provided.10 With
supply-sensitive care, the amount of spending on the same
condition also varies widely depending on where the patient
lives.11 Supply-sensitive customary care is also referred to as
the overuse of medical care in this article. These broad
variations in the use of medical care are discussed in Part I.D.
B.

Customary Care Can Be Poor Quality Care: Misuse and
Underuse

The last several decades of public health research have
revealed that customary care can actually be “bad” patient
care. Customary care can lead to misuse and underuse of the
delivery of healthcare. Misuse occurs when the wrong care is
provided. Underuse is the failure to deliver necessary
healthcare; in other words, care for which the benefits clearly
outweigh the risks.12
The 1980s brought the first group of studies that
revealed that many customary treatment choices resulted in
the misuse of healthcare. These studies exposed “serious
weaknesses in the scientific underpinnings of many customary
practices.”13 For example, the use of certain respiratory
9

Id.
Id.
11
See id.
12
Minal S. Kale et al., Trends in the Overuse of Ambulatory Health Care
Services in the United States, ARCH. INTERN. MED. E1, E1-E2 (2012).
13
Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines as Legal Standards Governing
Physician Liability, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87, 88-89 & n.6 (1991) (citing, for
10
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techniques and gastric freezing of ulcers, which were quickly
adopted as “standard practice,” were ultimately discredited by
scientific studies.14 More recently, the practice of prescribing a
choice among a broad array of antibiotics for uncomplicated
urinary tract infections was identified as misuse—only the
prescription of nitrofurantoin, trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole,
or quinolone is appropriate.15 Another study disclosed that
medications are customarily misused in elderly patients 7.2%
of the time.16 Other common practices that have been
discredited are the routine use of antiarrhythmic drugs for all
patients with irregular heartbeats after a heart attack17 and the
long-held, but erroneous, belief that hormone replacement
therapy prevents heart disease in women.18 It has also been
established that lumbar discectomy, the most common surgical
treatment for those with back and leg pain, is largely
unnecessary.19 And in 2011, a study was published that

example, David M. Eddy & John Billings, The Quality of Medical Evidence:
Implications for Quality of Care, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1988, at 19, 20 (“For at least
some important practices, the existing evidence is of such poor quality that it is
virtually impossible to determine even what effect the practice has on patients, much
less whether that effect is preferable to the outcomes that would have occurred with
other options.”)); David M. Eddy, Clinical Policies and the Quality of Clinical Practice,
307 NEW ENG. J. MED. 343, 343 (1982) (“[T]here is reason to believe that there are
flaws in the process by which the profession generates clinical policies.”).
14
See, e.g., Havighurst, supra note 13, at 88-89 & n.6; Eddy, supra note 13, at 343.
15
Kale et al., supra note 12, at E1-E2 (“[U]se of antibiotics other than
nitrofurantoin, trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole or quinolone” is the incorrect treatment
for “uncomplicated urinary tract infections.”).
16
Id. at E5.
17
Christine Gorman, Are Doctors Just Playing Hunches, TIME (Feb. 15,
2007), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1590448,00.html. The longfollowed, customary practice of physicians has been to prescribe antiarrhythmia drugs
to every patient who experiences irregular heartbeats after a heart attack. Id. A
surprising study showed that patients with only mild arrhythmias are more likely to
die if they take antiarrhythmia drugs. Id. Based on this empirical evidence, some
physicians have modified their practice and adopted the evidence-based choice, and
give the medication only to those with severe cardiac arrhythmias post heart attack.
Id. But some still have not. Id.
18
Mark A. Hlatky et al., Quality-of-Life and Depressive Symptoms in
Postmenopausal Women After Receiving Hormone Therapy: Results From the Heart and
Estrogen/Progestin Replacement Study (HERS) Trial, 287 JAMA 591, 591 (2002)
(finding that in 2763 postmenopausal women with pre-existing coronary artery disease
who were randomly assigned to take either estrogen/progestin HRT or a placebo,
researchers found no overall reduction in the rate of coronary heart disease events
among the women receiving HRT compared to those receiving the placebo). This new
reality altered the risk-benefit calculus that was formerly used to recommend hormone
replacement therapy to tens of thousands of women. See generally id.
19
James N. Weinstein et al., Surgical v. Non-Operative Treatment for
Lumbar Disc Herniation, 296 JAMA 2441, 2445, 2447 (2006). Those who had surgery
and those who were provided with more conservative treatment, such as physical
therapy, reached the same level of recovery. Id.
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estimated that the choice to surgically implant cardioverterdefibrillators (ICDs) was incorrect 20%–40% of the time.20
On the other hand, a large group of physicians stick to
customary practices of not providing important medical care,
even in the face of empirical evidence that those treatments
would greatly benefit their patients, in many cases placing
their patients at a significantly increased risk of death. These
customs represent underuse of healthcare.21 A major study was
released in 200522 that surprised many. This study uncovered
the unfortunate failure of both physicians and hospitals to
provide treatments that were essential for saving the lives of
those who suffered from the most common causes of death—
pneumonia, heart attack, and heart failure.23
A major study published on December 24, 2012,
suggests that there has been little improvement on the part of
individual physicians in this underuse problem in the seven
years since the 2005 study.24 For example, physicians fail to
provide antithrombotic treatment for atrial fibrillation 28.1% of
the time.25 This treatment, when provided, decreases the risk of
stroke for these patients.26 Physicians fail to provide aspirin
35.5% of the time, beta-blockers 44.8% of the time, and statins
41.4% of the time for patients with coronary heart disease.27
Aspirin reduces the occurrence of vascular events in patients
with coronary artery disease, including myocardial infarction
20

Sana M. Al-Khatib et al., Non-Evidence-Based ICD Implantations in the
United States, 305 JAMA 43, 43 (2011). The use of implantable cardioverterdefibrillators (ICDs) can prevent sudden cardiac death. Id. In the study, over 20% of
patients were given surgically implanted ICDs inappropriately. Id. at 45. The
percentage of inappropriate implantation of ICDs was as high as 40%. Id. at 48.
21
See Kale et al., supra note 12, at E1.
22
Ashish K. Jha et al., Care in U.S. Hospitals—The Hospital Quality Alliance
Program, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 265, 265 (2005).
23
See Ford Fessenden, It’s the Simple Things, but Some Hospitals Don’t Do
Them, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2005, § 4, at 43, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
learning/teachers/featured_articles/20050822monday.html. For example, patients who
are prescribed aspirin within the first twenty-four hours after a heart attack have up to
a thirty percent improvement in their rate of survival. Id. However, many physicians
fail to provide this very simple, life-saving treatment.
24
Kale et al., supra note 12.
25
Id. at E2.
26
N.A. Mark Estes III et al., ACC/AHA/Physician Consortium 2008 Clinical
Performance Measures for Adults With Nonvalvular Atrial Fibrillation or Atrial
Flutter: A Report of the American College of Cardiology/American Heart Association
Task Force on Performance Measures and the Physician Consortium for Performance
Improvement (Writing Committee to Develop Clinical Performance Measures for Atrial
Fibrillation), 117 CIRCULATION 1101-20 (2008), available at http://circ.ahajournals.org/
content/117/8/1101.full.pdf+html (“Atrial fibrillation is associated with an increased risk
of stroke, heart failure, and all-cause mortality, especially in women.”).
27
Kale et al., supra note 12, at E2.
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and death.28 Failure to prescribe beta-blockers “can be
associated with a broad range of adverse outcomes, including
all-cause and cardiovascular mortality, cardiovascular
hospitalizations, and the need for revascularization
procedures.”29 “The use of statins reduces [the] risk of
cardiovascular events.”30
Physicians also fail to provide beta-blockers in patients
with congestive heart failure 40.3% of the time31 (beta-blockers
improve symptoms and significantly improve mortality32) and
fail to use statins in patients with diabetes mellitus 63.8% of
the time33 (statins produce a 19%–55% reduction in cardiovascular disease events in patients with diabetes mellitus—a
major cause of mortality).34 In addition, there is a failure by
physicians to use ACE inhibitors in congestive heart failure
58.4% of the time. ACE inhibitors, combined with standard
treatment, slow the progression of heart failure in patients
with mild symptoms, and their use has shown “beneficial
effects on mortality, morbidity, and quality of life.”35 Finally,
physicians fail to use antiplatelets in stroke patients 51.3% of
the time (antiplatelets significantly decrease risk of secondary
stroke, myocardial infarction, and death36) and fail to use the
pharmacologic treatment of osteoporosis 54.9% of the time37

28

AM. COLL. OF CARDIOLOGY FOUND. ET AL., CHRONIC STABLE CORONARY
ARTERY DISEASE: PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT SET 55 (Jan. 2011), available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/pcpi/cadminisetjune06.pdf.
29
Id. at 61.
30
Id. at 29.
31
Kale et al., supra note 12, at E2.
32
William E. Chavey II, The Importance of Beta Blockers in the Treatment of
Heart Failure, 1 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 2453, 2453-62 (2000), available at http://www.aafp.org/
afp/2000/1201/p2453.html.
33
Kale et al., supra note 12, at E2.
34
John Buse, Statin Treatment in Diabetes Mellitus, 21 CLINICAL DIABETES 168,
171 (2003).
Since the 1970s, there have been substantial epidemiological data demonstrating
that cardiovascular diseases (here defined as inschemic heart disease, stroke, and
peripheral vascular disease) constitute the primary cause of morbidity and mortality
in patients with diabetes. In fact, at least 60% and arguably 80% of people with
diabetes will eventually succumb to cardiovascular disease (CVD).
Id. at 168.
35

M.K. Davies et al., ABC of Heart Failure Management: Diuretics, ACE
Inhibitors, and Nitrates, 320 BMJ 428, 429 (2000).
36
Dawn Meyer, Antiplatelets and Stroke Outcomes: State of the Science, 21
CRIT. CARE NURS. CLIN. N. AM. 517-28 (2009).
37
Kale et al., supra note 12, at E2.
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(pharmacologic treatment can “prevent fractures in men and
women with low bone density or osteoporosis”38).
All of these studies, taken together, demonstrate that
following customary care can actually negatively impact
quality of care by either suggesting that a physician provide the
wrong treatment or fail to provide a lifesaving treatment. Thus,
following customary care may mean that a patient’s condition
may not only fail to improve, it may worsen, while also exposing
that patient to unnecessary risks, long-term disability, or death.
C.

Customary Care Is Related More to Location than to
Quality: Unwarranted Variation

In the 1980s, an entirely separate series of surprising
empirical studies raised the question of whether patients
receive very different care depending on where they live,
suggesting that customary care might have a stronger link to
geography than to quality.39 It appeared from these studies that
the choices physicians make when treating the identical
clinical conditions vary widely from region to region.40 These
38

Amir Qaseem et al., Pharmacologic Treatment of Low Bone Density or
Osteoporosis to Prevent Fractures: A Clinical Practice Guideline from the American
College of Physicians, 149 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 404, 405 (2008).
39
See generally John Wennberg & Alan Gittelsohn, Small Area Variations in
Health Care Delivery, 182 SCI. 1102 (1973) [hereinafter Wennberg I]; John E.
Wennberg et al., Professional Uncertainty and the Problem of Supplier-Induced
Demand, 16 SOC. SCI. MED. 811, 812-17 (1982) [hereinafter Wennberg et al.,
Professional Uncertainty] (detailing differences in surgical practices); John E.
Wennberg, Dealing With Medical Practice Variations: A Proposal For Action, HEALTH
AFF., Summer 1984, at 6, 7 [hereinafter Wennberg II] (variations in surgical
procedures and medical treatments were documented); David M. Eddy, Variations in
Physician Practice: The Role of Uncertainty, HEALTH AFF., Fall 1984, at 74, 77-80
(detailing physician variations in choice of diagnosis and of procedure); Mark R.
Chassin et al., Variations in the Use of Medical and Surgical Services by the Medicare
Population, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 285, 287 (1986) (measuring variation in rates of use
by Medicare beneficiaries).
40
See generally Wennberg I, supra note 39. For example,
In Maine, by the time women reach seventy years of age in one hospital market the
likelihood they have undergone a hysterectomy is 20 percent while in another
market it is 70 percent. In Iowa, the chances that male residents who reach age
eighty five have undergone prostatectomy range from a low of 15 percent to a high of
more than 60 percent in different hospital markets. In Vermont, the probability that
resident children will undergo a tonsillectomy has ranged from a low of 8 percent in
one hospital market to a high of 70 percent in another.
Id. at 9; see also Mark A. Hall & Michael D. Green, Introduction, 37 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 663, 670-71 (2002) (citing Bruce E. Landon et al., Personal, Organizational, and
Market Level Influences on Physician Practice Patterns: Results of a National Survey of
Primary Care Physicians, 39 MED. CARE 889, 889 (2001) (failing to find, through the
use of clinical vignettes, any evidence of “a consistent practice style” for certain
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studies prompted the creation of The Dartmouth Atlas of
Health Care so that these issues could be intensely
investigated.41 The Dartmouth Atlas Project (DAP) has
confirmed what the initial studies suggested: there is a wide
variation of treatments for the same condition from region to
region across the entire United States.42
For example, a patient is five times more likely to be
treated with a lower extremity bypass if that patient lives in
Baltimore, Maryland than if that patient lives in Temple, Texas.
Patients with prostate cancer are three times more likely to be
treated with a radical prostatectomy if they live in Salt Lake
City, Utah than if they live in San Francisco, California.43
An infrequent, but devastating, complication of diabetes
and peripheral vascular disease is amputation. A patient’s
chances of leg amputation can change by a factor of ten
depending on where that patient lives.44 Other examples
include the rates of hip, knee, and shoulder replacements. A
patient who lives in Ogden, Utah is four times more likely to
receive a hip replacement than a patient who lives in Bryan,
Texas.45 Similarly, a patient living in Lincoln, Nebraska is
almost four times more likely to receive a knee replacement than
a patient living in New York, New York.46 And a patient living in
common discretionary medical decisions)); see also James F. Blumstein, The Legal
Liability Regime: How Well Is It Doing In Assuring Quality, Accounting for Costs, and
Coping with an Evolving Reality In The Health Care Marketplace, 11 ANNALS HEALTH
L. 125, 137 (2002) (Thus, “to ask an expert . . . what the ‘customary practice’ is [for a
particular condition] on a national basis . . . is to ask a question to which there cannot
be, for many diagnosis and treatment decisions, a coherent answer.”).
41
Dartmouth Atlas, supra note 5.
42
See CTR. FOR THE EVALUATIVE CLINICAL SCI., DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH
CARE: STUDIES OF SURGICAL VARIATION SPINE SURGERY, available at
http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/downloads/reports/Spine_Surgery_2006.pdf (last updated
Apr. 15, 2010). For example, a patient is twenty times more likely to have surgery if that
patient lives in Idaho Falls, Missoula, or Mason City than if that patient lives in
Newark, Bangor, or Terre Haute. Id. at 7. Other examples: A patient living in
Bradenton, Florida is seventy-five percent more likely to have spinal surgery than a
patient living in Tampa, Florida, id., and a patient is fifty percent more likely to have
hip surgery if that patient lives in Fort Lauderdale than in neighboring Miami, ELLIOTT
S. FISHER ET AL., TRENDS AND REGIONAL VARIATION IN HIP, KNEE, AND SHOULDER
REPLACEMENT 17 (Apr. 6, 2010), available at http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/
downloads/reports/Joint_Replacement_0410.pdf.
43
ANITA ARORA ET AL., WHAT KIND OF PHYSICIAN WILL YOU BE? VARIATION IN
HEALTH CARE AND ITS IMPORTANCE FOR RESIDENCY TRAINING 10 (Oct. 30, 2012), available
at http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/downloads/reports/Residency_report_103012.pdf.
44
Philip P. Goodney et al., Variation in the Use of Lower Extremity Vascular
Procedures for Critical Limb Ischemia, 5 CIRC. CARDIOVASC. QUAL. OUTCOMES 1, 2
(2012), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3281555/.
45
FISHER ET AL., supra note 42, at 6.
46
Id. at 8.
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Provo, Utah is ten times more likely to receive a shoulder
replacement than someone living in Syracuse, New York.47
Another study demonstrated that the amount and type
of care for chronically ill patients at the end of life differed
greatly at academic medical centers located in different regions
across the country.48 The authors point out that “[t]he degree of
variation . . . suggests . . . that patients are receiving care and
resident physicians are receiving training that reflects the local
practice style of their teaching hospital.”49
These studies indicate that what constitutes customary
care can be based on physician preferences (referred to in one
major study as “local practice style[s]”50) unlinked from best
practices and that these preferences can be highly dependent on
the region in which the physician practices.
D.

Customary Care Can Be Costly Healthcare: Overuse

Customary care can also result in overuse of healthcare.
Of the estimated $700 billion wasted every year by the U.S.
healthcare system, “over use, or the delivery of services for
which the risks exceed the benefits, has been identified as a
significant component, equaling roughly 280 billion.”51 Overall,
“[r]esearch on appropriateness indicates that from one quarter
to one third of medical services may be of no value to
patients.”52 For example, 11.3% of screening EKGs, 25.3% of
screening urine analyses, 7.0% of screening x-rays, and 37.9%
of complete blood counts are unnecessarily ordered as part of a
general medical exam.53 Antibiotics are unnecessarily
prescribed for upper respiratory tract infections 40.2% of the
time, for acute bronchitis 58.8% of the time, and for asthma
6.8% of the time.54
A 2012 study from the Stanford University School of
Medicine revealed that an invasive heart test, used routinely to
47

Id. at 10.
ARORA ET AL., supra note 43, at 7.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Kale et al., supra note 12, at E2 (citing THOMSON REUTERS, WHERE CAN
$700 BILLION IN WASTE BE CUT ANNUALLY FROM THE US HEALTH-CARE SYSTEM?
(2009), available at https://healthleadersmedia.com/content/241965.pdf).
52
See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 7-1, at 34 (5th ed. 2004)
(citing Robert Brook & Kathleen Lohr, Will We Need to Ration Effective Medical Care?,
3 ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH., no. 1, at 68 (Fall 1986)).
53
Kale et al., supra note 12, at E5.
54
Id.
48
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measure heart function, is being dramatically overused.55 This
test is called a left ventriculography, or left ventriculogram,
and it measures the percentage of blood that gets squeezed out
with each heartbeat for a cost of $300.56 Out of 37,000 Aetna
patients studied who underwent this test in 2007, 88% had
already received another, more effective test that provided the
same (and in many cases, better) data to the physician.57 These
patients received the left ventriculogram test inappropriately,
exposing them to the risks of side effects from injecting the dye,
increased radiation exposure, and an increased risk of heart
arrhythmias and stroke with no resulting benefit,58 wasting
$976,800 in just this one group of patients in one year.
The DAP suggests that much of this overuse occurs
because these are supply-sensitive services. The care of
chronically ill, elderly patients provides a good example of how
these supply-sensitive services lead to overuse.59 Popular,
customary belief is

55

Ronald M. Witteles et al., Use and Overuse of Left Ventriculography, 163
AM. HEART J. 617 (2012).
56
Invasive Heart Test Being Dramatically Overused, Study Shows,
SCIENCEDAILY
(Apr.
6,
2012),
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2012/04/
120406234519.htm.
57
Id.
58
Id. In 2011, the National Physicians Alliance through its Good
Stewardship project identified the top five overused ambulatory care practices in
internal medicine, family medicine and pediatrics and then began a campaign to
educate physicians in how to avoid these overuses. Good Stewardship Working Grp.,
The “Top 5” Lists in Primary Care: Meeting the Responsibility of Professionalism, 171
ARCH. INTERN. MED. 1385-90 (2011). The “Choosing Wisely” campaign was started the
following year by the American Board of Internal Medicine Foundation in coordination
with nine physician specialty groups to identify tests or procedures that are commonly
used but are not always appropriate. Choosing Wisely: An Initiative of the ABIM
Foundation, http://choosingwisely.org (last visited Mar. 12, 2013).
59
Dartmouth Press Release, supra note 4 (press release summarizing the
study findings: “Almost One-Third of Medicare Spending for Chronically Ill
Unnecessary, According to Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care; Improving Care Could
Also Lower Costs”) (referring to ELLIOT FISHER ET AL., THE CARE OF PATIENTS WITH
SEVERE CHRONIC ILLNESS: AN ONLINE REPORT ON THE MEDICARE PROGRAM BY THE
DARTMOUTH ATLAS PROJECT (2006), available at http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/
downloads/atlases/2006_Chronic_Care_Atlas.pdf). This
Dartmouth Atlas Project studied the records of 4.7 million Medicare enrollees who
died from 2000 to 2003 and had at least one of 12 chronic illnesses. The study
demonstrates that even within this limited patient population, Medicare could have
realized substantial savings—$40 billion or nearly one-third of what it spent for
their care over the four years—if all U.S. hospitals practiced at the high-quality/lowcost standard set by the Salt Lake City region. The report comes on the heels of a
report by Medicare’s trustees that the insurance program will exhaust its trust fund
in 2018, two years earlier than previously forecast.
Dartmouth Press Release, supra note 4.
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that more services—that is, using every available resource such as
specialists, hospital and ICU beds, diagnostic tests and imaging
etc.—produces better outcomes. Based on this assumption, the
supply of resources—not the incidence of illness—drives utilization
of the services. In effect, the supply of hospital beds, ICU beds, and
specialty physicians creates its own demand, so areas with more
resources per capita have higher costs per capita.60

One of the DAP’s groundbreaking studies released in 2006
investigating the amount of care provided to chronically ill,
elderly patients reviewed data from the top academic medical
centers in the country and discovered that
the average number of hospitalized days during the last six months
of life ranged from 12.9 days per decedent at St. Mary’s Hospital (the
principal hospital of the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minn.) to 23.9 at
New York-Presbyterian Hospital. The University of California at Los
Angeles teaching hospital had the highest average number of days in
intensive care units during the last six months of life (11.4 days per
decedent), a rate 3.5 times higher than the rate for patients treated
at the University of California teaching hospital in San Francisco
(3.3 days per decedent). Medicare enrollees who were patients of the
New York University Medical Center had an average of 76.2
physician visits during their last six months of life, almost one-third
more than patients at the next-highest rate academic medical center,
the Robert Wood Johnson University Hospital (57.7 visits per
decedent). Patients of the University of Kentucky Hospital had
slightly more than half as many (18.6) physician visits as the
national average (33.5).61

Importantly, the study debunked the “‘more is better’
myth in health care,” as hospitals that provided more intensive
care and spent more did not get better results.62 On the other
60

Dartmouth Press Release, supra note 4.

The financial incentives used by Medicare and most other payers encourage the
overuse of acute care hospital services and the proliferation of medical specialists.
The care of people with chronic illness accounts for more than 75 percent of all U.S.
health care expenditures, indicating that overuse and overspending is not just a
Medicare problem—the health care system as a whole has not developed efficient,
effective ways of caring for people with severe chronic illnesses.
Id.
61
62

Id.
Id.

The researchers studied patients with chronic illnesses because about 30 to 35
percent of Medicare dollars are spent on people with these conditions during the last
two years of their lives. Two-thirds of those in the study were diagnosed with cancer,
congestive heart failure and/or chronic lung disease. “The majority of acute care
hospitals are applying their standard forms of ‘rescue medicine’ to people who are
in advanced stages of diseases that can’t be cured,” said Wennberg. “Patients
don’t benefit—they can’t be rescued—and the costs of such care are very high,
both in dollars spent and in providing care that the majority of chronically-ill
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hand, those “with the best quality and [best] outcomes used far
fewer resources.”63 For example, “[p]atients in low-cost, highquality regions such as Salt Lake City, Utah, Rochester, Minn.,
and Portland, Ore., are admitted less frequently to hospitals,
spend less time in intensive care units and see fewer
specialists.”64 What this demonstrates is that the hospitals that
are making low-cost choices are not withholding needed care.65
They are simply more efficient by providing better outcomes
while using fewer resources.66 The authors of the study
recommend that “[t]hese organizations offer a benchmark of
performance toward which other systems should strive.”67 This
study agreed with other estimates that 30%–35% of the cost of
Medicare could be saved if the overuse generated by regional
customs was avoided.68
In a recent New Yorker article on the issue of the
overuse of medical services, Harvard Professor Atul Gawande
examined the reasons that McAllen, Texas is one of the most
expensive markets in the country, second only to Miami,
Florida.69 He opined that “[t]he cause of McAllen’s extreme costs
was, very simply, across-the-board overuse of medicine.” In his
article, Professor Gawande pointed out that Medicare spends
two times the national average on Medicare enrollees in
McAllen. This totaled fifteen thousand dollars per patient, per
year.70 He observed that,
[b]etween 2001 and 2005, critically ill Medicare patients received
almost fifty percent more specialist visits in McAllen than in El
Paso, and were two-thirds more likely to see ten or more specialists
in a six month period. In 2005 and 2006, patients in McAllen
received twenty percent more abdominal ultrasounds, thirty percent
more bone-density studies, sixty percent more nerve-conduction
studies to diagnose carpal-tunnel syndrome, and five hundred and
fifty percent more urine-flow studies to diagnose prostate troubles.
They received one-fifth to two-thirds more gall bladder operations,
knee replacements, breast biopsies, and bladder scopes. They
patients might not want, such as admissions to intensive care and being sent to
specialist after specialist.”
Id.
63

Id.
Id.
65
See id.
66
See id.
67
Id.
68
See id.
69
Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum, NEW YORKER (June 1, 2009),
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/06/01/090601fa_fact_gawande?currentPage=all.
70
Id.
64
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received two to three times as many pacemakers, implantable
defibrillators, cardiac-bypass operations, carotid endartectomies, and
coronary artery stents. And Medicare paid for five times as many
home-nurse visits.71

And yet, compared to neighboring El Paso, a similar
community, the hospitals in McAllen did not provide better
quality of care.72 On the twenty-five metrics that Medicare uses
to measure quality, El Paso performed better than McAllen on
each metric.73 Importantly, a patient is exposed to unnecessary
risk each time that patient has an unwarranted invasive test
or surgery. These risks could include the possibility of physical
disability or death.
II.

GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS PROVIDING HEALTHCARE
HAVE ADOPTED EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE

A.

Veterans Administration Hospitals, Medicare, and
Medicaid

The quality and cost problems with the customary care
model have led to new national initiatives to move the United
States toward a modern, evidence-based model of medical
practice through major changes in government-provided
healthcare. Together, government programs provide healthcare
for over 80 million people.74 The VA Hospital System is a good
example of a system that works well in coordinating care and
improving outcomes through evidence-based medicine.75 The
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has also taken
steps through Medicare to encourage healthcare providers to use
71

Id.
Id.
73
Id.
74
Health insurance is now primarily provided by the government in the
public sector, with 60-65% of healthcare provision and spending coming from programs
such as Medicare, Medicaid, TRICARE, the Children's Health Insurance Program, and
the Veterans Health Administration. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2007
(2008). Before ACA, around 84.7% of Americans had some form of health insurance;
either through their employer or the employer of their spouse or parent (59.3%),
purchased individually (8.9%), or provided by government programs (27.8%; there is
some overlap in these figures). All government health care programs have restricted
eligibility, and there is no government health insurance company which covers all
Americans. Before ACA, Americans without health insurance coverage totaled 15.3% of
the population, or 45.7 million people. Id.
75
PHILLIP LONGMAN, BEST CARE ANYWHERE: WHY VA HEALTH CARE IS BETTER
THAN YOURS 1-10 (2007) (describing the VA system and its practice of evidence-based
medicine resulting in well-coordinated care that results in good outcomes).
72
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best practices grounded in evidence-based guidelines to improve
outcomes through several major programs.76
The first program adopted by CMS that focuses on best
practices deals with “never events.” Never events are
preventable medical errors that would not occur if best
practices were followed.77 Oddly enough, before the never
events initiative, healthcare providers could bill for the
additional services required to treat patients for the injuries
caused by these mistakes.78 These additional payments
amounted to a bonus for bad patient care. Under the never
events approach, CMS will not reimburse healthcare providers
for these costs, forcing the healthcare providers to bear the cost
of their mistakes79 and encouraging the adoption of best
practices to avoid making them. This program also requires
that hospitals report never events to state officials to allow for
outcome tracking. The public shaming that comes with
publishing this data also encourages best practices to avoid

76

For a detailed overview of these quality of care measures, see JAMES T.
O’REILLY, HEALTHCARE RULEMAKING GUIDE: ADMINISTRATIVE RULES IMPLEMENTING
THE NEW HEALTH CARE LAWS (2012) (a treatise on all of the provisions in ACA), and
Barry Furrow, Regulating Patient Safety: The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
159 U. PENN. L. REV. 1727, 1737 (2011) (providing an overview of the quality of care
provisions contained in both ACA and other government provided healthcare programs).
77
The concept of “never events” was first developed by the National Quality
Forum (NQF) to describe gross medical errors, “errors in medical care that are clearly
identifiable, preventable, and serious in their consequences for patients, and that
indicate a real problem in the safety and credibility of a health care facility.” Press
Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Eliminating Serious, Preventable, and
Costly
Medical
Errors—Never
Events
(May
18,
2006),
available
at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/press/release.asp?Counter=1863;
Agency
for
Healthcare Research & Quality, Patient Safety Primers, http://www.psnet.ahrq.gov/
primer.aspx?primerID=3 (last visited on Mar. 29, 2013) (“The term ‘Never Event’ was
first introduced in 2001 by Ken Kizer, MD, former CEO of the National Quality Forum
(NQF), in reference to particularly shocking medical errors (such as wrong-site
surgery) that should never occur.”). Some examples of never events are: “surgery on the
wrong body part; foreign body left in a patient after surgery; mismatched blood
transfusion; major medication error; severe ‘pressure ulcer’ acquired in the hospital;
and preventable post-operative deaths.” Id. A reporting requirement for “never events”
has been adopted by over twenty states. These reporting requirements force providers
to disclose adverse outcomes to the appropriate state department, with the goal of
improving their operations. Id.
78
Lucian L. Leape & Donald M. Berwick, Five Years After To Err Is Human:
What Have We Learned, 293 JAMA 2384, 2388 (2005).
79
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. FISCAL YEAR 2009 QUALITY MEASURE
REPORTING FOR 2010 PAYMENT UPDATE, available at http://www.cms.gov/HospitalQualityInits/
downloads/HospitalRHQDAPU200808.pdf.
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errors.80 As a follow-on program, CMS also recently began to
refuse reimbursement for hospital-acquired infections.81
A second program, the Premier Quality Initiative,
started in 2002 when CMS began ranking hospitals by
performance, based on patient outcomes that can be positively
affected by the adoption of best practices.82 Depending on a
hospital’s ranking, it can receive a bonus or a reduced
payment.83 This program includes a reporting incentive by
giving those hospitals that report certain quality data a higher
annual increase in their payment rates. This data is then used
to rank participating hospitals,84 and these rankings are
available on the consumer-friendly Hospital Compare website.85
Consumers can decide which hospital to use to decrease their
risk of death or complications from, for example, a particular
surgical procedure. Finally, CMS has issued a proposed rule86 to
integrate overall patient experience of care into its reward
system.87 This gives weight to the goal of establishing patientcentered care by giving patients a place at the table so their
voices can be heard. Hospitals that score well in both quality of
care provided and patient experience of care would receive
higher payments under this proposed rule.88
A third program, the Physician Quality Reporting
System (PQRS), is targeted at physicians and provides
80

Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 77.
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid—CMS, PREMIER, http://www.premierinc.com/
quality-safety/tools-services/safety/topics/guidelines/cms-guidelines-4-infection.jsp (last
visited Mar. 12, 2013).
82
ALLIANCE FOR HEALTH REFORM, REWARDING SUPERIOR QUALITY CARE: THE
PREMIER HOSPITAL QUALITY INCENTIVE DEMONSTRATION: CENTERS FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVICES FACT SHEET (2006), available at http://www.allhealth.org/
BriefingMaterials/HospitalPremierFS200602-175.pdf (outlining the methods used to
score and rank hospitals based on quality measures); see also Ctrs. for Medicare &
Medicaid Servs., Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration, https://www.cms.gov/
Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-Assessment-Instruments/HospitalQualityInits/
HospitalPremier.html (last updated Jan. 9, 2013, 9:25 AM) (same, along with setting
forth some of the results of the project).
83
ALLIANCE FOR HEALTH REFORM, supra note 82.
84
Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., CMS Updates the
National Hospital Quality Measure Acute Myocardial Infarction Set for Discharges as
of April 1, 2009 (Dec. 31, 2008), available at www.cms.gov/HospitalQualityInits/
Downloads/HospitalAMI-6FactSheet.pdf.
85
Hospital Compare, MEDICARE, http://www.medicare.gov/hospitalcompare/
(last visited Mar. 12, 2013).
86
Hospital Inpatient Value-Based Purchasing Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 2454
(proposed Jan. 13, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 422 and 480).
87
Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Affordable Care Act
to Improve Hospital Care for Patients (Jan. 7, 2011), available at http://www.cms.gov/
apps/media/press/release.asp?Counter=3893.
88
Id.
81
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increased reimbursement for physicians who report
information on quality measures. These measures are focused
on patient outcomes for services covered by the Physician Fee
Schedule under Medicare Part B.89 PQRS was expanded in 2011
to add twenty new reporting measures. Starting in 2015,
physicians will be docked for failing to report data on patient
outcomes.90 Of special interest is the bonus that physicians
received starting in 2011 for writing prescriptions
electronically.91 In 2012, physicians who fail to do so will have
their reimbursements docked.92 The goal of this initiative is to
prevent the millions of medication errors that occur in the
United States every year. It also will provide the ability to
track the prescription practices of physicians.
B.

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010
(the ACA) was signed into law by President Obama on March
23, 2010.93 Almost all of the press to date has focused on the
ACA’s goal of improving access to health care by increasing the
number of people who qualify for Medicaid and by changing the
private insurance market with the advent of the individual
mandate. However, improving the quality and cost of
healthcare is also a major goal of the Act. There are several
major initiatives contained in the ACA that reflect this goal
and which all work to encourage the practice of evidence-based
medicine by building on the already strong CMS efforts
described in the previous section.
Importantly, in conjunction with the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (the Recovery Act),94 the ACA
89

The Medicare Improvements and Extension Act of 2006, sec. 101(b), § 1848,
120 Stat. 2975, 2975-77, established the PQRS. The PQRS was originally called the PQRI
(Physician Quality Reporting Initiative). Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid
Servs., Physician Quality Reporting System and E-Prescribing Program (Nov. 3, 2010),
available at http://www.cms.gov/apps/media/press/factsheet.asp?Counter=3858.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified as amended in
scattered sections of Titles 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 of the United States Code).
94
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, tit.
VIII, 123 Stat. 115, 175-77 (2009); see also Comparative Effectiveness Research
Funding, HHS.GOV, http://www.hhs.gov/recovery/programs/cer/index.html (last visited
Mar. 12, 2013) (showing research funding allocation among government entities). The
Recovery Act created the Federal Coordinating Council for Comparative Effectiveness
Research to organize such research across the federal government. Recovery Act § 804,
123 Stat. at 187-88; reflected in 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-8.
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will be providing hundreds of millions of dollars of funding for
research to develop evidence-based clinical practice guidelines
that will be used to define the best practices that the Act
promotes.95 For example, under § 10303 of the ACA, these best
practices96 will be used to create more of the same types of
patient outcome measures that are already being utilized in
Medicare.97 The ACA creates a new oversight entity, the
Patient-Centered Outcomes Research (PCOR) Institute, to
direct the Comparative Effectiveness Program that will create
data banks98 comparing the effectiveness of two or more
treatments.99 These databanks will provide much needed
95

See, e.g., 123 Stat. at 176-78.

The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) has opportunities under
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) to provide
patients, clinicians, and others evidence-based information to make informed
decisions about health care. The Recovery Act contains $1.1 billion for comparative
effectiveness research. Of the total, $300 million is for AHRQ to build on its existing
collaborative and transparent Effective Health Care program.
AHRQ and the Recovery Act, http://www.ahrq.gov/fund/cefarra.htm (last updated Nov.
2011). The National Guideline Clearinghouse is sponsored by the ARHQ. The National
Guideline Clearinghouse reviews all clinical practice guidelines for the quality of the
evidence supporting them. NAT’L GUIDELINE CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.guideline.gov/
about/index.aspx (last visited Jan. 14, 2012) (providing a “public resource for evidence
based clinical practice guidelines”).
96
Section 6301 mandates patient-centered outcomes research as a part of the
larger goal of developing comparative clinical effectiveness research (CER). The section
defines “comparative clinical effectiveness research” to mean “research evaluating and
comparing health outcomes and the clinical effectiveness, risks, and benefits of 2 or
more medical treatments [and] services . . . .” Recovery Act § 1181(a)(2)(A). ACA
further defines medical treatments and services broadly, to include the provision of
care as well as the use of medical devices, pharmaceuticals, and “integrative health
practices.” Id. § 1181(a)(2)(B). CER is well funded, with $1.1 billion provided by the
Recovery Act divided among the AHRQ ($300 million), the National Institutes of
Health ($400 million), and the Office of the HHS Secretary ($400 million). Agency for
Healthcare Research & Quality, Overview of the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act, http://www.ahrq.gov/legacy/fund/cefarraover.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2013).
97
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) § 10303(a), amending
§ 931(f), 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-31(f) (2010) (giving the Secretary of Health and Human
Services two years to develop at least ten outcome measurements for acute and chronic
diseases, including the five most prevalent and resource-intensive conditions and three
years to develop ten primary and preventative care measurements for distinct populations).
98
Once the research is completed, Section 6301 creates a system for
distributing and posting in a database the results of this research through AHRQs Office
of Communication and Knowledge Transfer. ACA § 6301(b), amending § 937(a)(1).
99
The PCOR Institute is not a government agency; instead, it is a non-profit
institute. ACA § 6301(a), § 1181(b)(1). The PCOR website describes its goals as follows:
Patient-Centered Outcomes Research (PCOR) helps people . . . make informed
health care decisions, allowing their voices to be heard in assessing the value of
health care options. This research answers patient-centered questions such as: 1.
“Given my personal characteristics, conditions and preferences, what should I
expect will happen to me?” 2. “What are my options and what are the benefits
and harms of those options?” 3. “What can I do to improve the outcomes that
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decision-making tools for both healthcare providers and
consumers in light of the multiple medications and treatments
that are marketed to deal with the same health condition.100
Adding another layer to this push for the nationwide
adoption of evidence-based medical practice is the ACA’s
creation of the Center for Quality Improvement and Patient
Safety (CQIPS).101 This center will develop tools to facilitate the
adoption of best practices by healthcare providers.102 CQIPS will
award grants and provide technical assistance in order to help
providers adopt best practices.103 With the addition of this center,
the ACA now has a system for the development of best practices
(AHRQ104), a system for publicizing these best practices (PCOR),
and a system for integrating these best practices (CQIPS) into
the everyday practices of hospitals and physicians.
Central to the ACA are the Health Benefit Exchanges.
In keeping with the ACA’s theme of improving quality and cost
of care, these exchanges also work instrumentally to move the
ball forward in these areas.105 In order to qualify to sell

are most important to me?” 4. “How can [the health care system] help me make
the best decisions about my health and healthcare?”
PATIENT-CENTERED OUTCOMES RESEARCH INST., PATIENT-CENTERED OUTCOMES
RESEARCH DEFINITION REVISION: RESPONSE TO PUBLIC INPUT (Feb. 15, 2012),
http://www.pcori.org/assets/PCOR-Definition-Revised-Draft-and-Responses-to-Input.pdf.
To answer these questions, PCOR . . . [a] Assesses the benefits and harms of
preventive, diagnostic, therapeutic, . . . or health delivery system interventions to
inform decision making, highlighting comparisons and outcomes that matter to
people; [b] Is inclusive of an individual’s preferences, autonomy and needs, focusing
on outcomes that people notice and care about such as survival, function, symptoms,
and health-related quality of life; [c] Incorporates a wide variety of settings and
diversity of participants to address individual differences and barriers to
implementation and dissemination; and [d] Investigates (or may investigate)
optimizing outcomes while addressing burden to individuals, resource availability,
and other stakeholder perspectives.
Id.
100

Priorities in research will be set according to gaps in the evidence over
clinical outcomes, areas of variation in medical practice, and areas of practice where
there are pressing quality concerns. These priorities will be delineated as part of the
national strategy for quality care. Recovery Act § 1181(d)(1)(A). The institute must also
release its research findings to clinicians, patients, and the public within ninety days of
receiving them. Id. § 1181(d)(8)(A). These findings will be made available on the
Institute’s website. Id. § 1181(h)(3).
101
ACA § 3501, § 933(a).
102
Recovery Act § 933(b)(2)-(5).
103
Id. § 934(a)(1).
104
See supra note 93.
105
Part II, Subtitle D of ACA, “Consumer Choices and Insurance Competition
Through Health Benefit Exchanges” contains important quality components. ACA
§ 1311 (spelling out the form of the American Health Benefit Exchanges).
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insurance to consumers through these exchanges,106 insurers
must evaluate providers by the same quality benchmarks that
CMS uses to rate providers,107 as described above.108 As with the
CMS reimbursements under Medicare, the higher the rating,
the greater the private insurance reimbursement will be for
healthcare services.109 Continuing the parallel, just like
Medicare, the insurance companies must also publish the
quality of care and patient satisfaction data that they gather.110
In a major change to private insurance practices, the ACA111
turns private insurers into mini regulatory agencies by
requiring private insurers to:
(A) improve health outcomes through the implementation of
activities such as quality reporting, effective case management, care
coordination, chronic disease management, and medication and care
compliance initiatives, . . . for treatment or services under the plan
or coverage;
(B) implement activities to prevent hospital readmissions through a
comprehensive program for hospital discharge that includes patientcentered education and counseling, comprehensive discharge
planning, and post discharge reinforcement by an appropriate health
care professional;
(C) implement activities to improve patient safety and reduce
medical errors through the appropriate use of best clinical practices,
evidence based medicine, and health information technology under
the plan or coverage; and
(D) implement wellness and health promotion activities.112

106

Subsection (c) details the criteria that health plans must meet to be
“qualified” to be sold on the exchanges. Id. § 1311(c).
107
These bench marks are similar to the ones used by CMS including patient
experience ratings, clinical quality measures, quality assurance, utilization
management, provider credentialing, complaints and appeals, patient information
programs and network adequacy and access. Id. § 1311(c)(1)(D).
108
See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
109
In the “Rewarding Quality Through Market-Based Incentives” sections of
ACA, reimbursement is required to be based upon quality and health outcome scores. ACA
§ 1311(g); id. § 1311(g)(1)(C) (payments must include incentives for “the implementation of
activities to improve patient safety and reduce medical errors through the appropriate
use of best clinical practices, evidence based medicine, and health information
technology under the plan or coverage.”).
110
Subsection (c)(1)(E) requires the plans to “implement a quality
improvement strategy,” id. § 1311(c)(1)(E), and subsection (c)(1)(H) requires disclosure
of quality measures to enrollees and prospective enrollees. Id. § 1311(c)(1)(H).
111
Id. § 1001, § 2717(a)(1).
112
Id. § 1001, § 2717(a)(1)(A)-(D). With regard to hospitals specifically, for
plans to be “qualified” to be sold on the health exchanges, § 1311(h), “Quality
Improvement,” specifies that the plan may contract with a hospital with more than
fifty beds only if the hospital “utilizes a patient safety evaluation system” and has a
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Together, the quality improvement provisions under the
ACA and CMS create a powerful regulatory engine that will
work to move the United States from a system that follows the
customary care model of medical care toward a modern,
evidence-based system of medical care.
III.

THE GROWING NUMBER OF STATE TORT SYSTEMS
ADOPTING EVIDENCE-BASED CARE AS THE STANDARD OF
CARE

State tort systems are slowly moving away from the
current majority rule, which uses customary practice as
conclusive evidence of the standard of care,113 as judges and
lawyers begin to recognize the problems with using custom (as
discussed above) as the exclusive proxy for quality.114 For
example, in order to meet the standard of care in a medical
malpractice case, a physician must “possess and use the care,
skill and knowledge ordinarily possessed and used under like
circumstances . . . .”115 Instead of limiting the scope of
admissible evidence in defining reasonable care to what is
customarily done under the circumstances, some state tort
systems are also allowing the introduction of risk-benefit
analysis grounded in empirical science as evidence of what is
reasonable quality care under the circumstances. This
transition away from the tort system’s use of custom as the
exclusive proxy for quality appears to benefit both the quality
and cost of healthcare. Thus, the tort systems of some states
are operating instrumentally to encourage the transition away
from custom-based medical practice to evidence-based medical
practice. Unfortunately, as discussed below, the majority of
state tort systems are acting to thwart that transition.

mechanism in place “to ensure that each patient receives a comprehensive program for
hospital discharge that includes patient-centered education and counseling,
comprehensive discharge planning, and post discharge reinforcement by an
appropriate health care professional.” Id. § 1311(h)(1)(A).
113
See generally Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Role of the Jury in Modern
Malpractice Law, 87 IOWA L. REV. 909 (2002) (discussing the merits of the role of
custom as conclusive evidence of the standard of care in malpractice litigation and the
movement by many states to use custom as only some evidence of the standard of care).
114
Id. at 909.
115
Burns v. Metz, 513 N.W.2d 505, 509 (Neb. 1994); Vergara v. Doan, 593
N.E.2d 185, 188 (Ind. 1992) (judging the physician’s conduct by a “minimum standard
of care for the particular practice”). For an excellent overview of medical malpractice
law, see DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 242, 631-34 (2000).
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Empirical Evidence of the Positive Impact on Quality of
Healthcare of Rejecting Customary Care as the Exclusive
Proxy for Quality

The positive impact that an evidence-based standard of
care in medical malpractice cases can have on quality and cost
of care is borne out by a recent empirical study that used data
on treatment utilization rates from 1977 to 2005 compiled by
the National Hospital Discharge Surveys. This study estimated
that there was “a 30 – 50% reduction in the gap between the
state and national utilization rates of various obstetric, cardiac
and diagnostic procedures following the abandonment of a rule
requiring physicians to meet the standards set by local
physicians and the contemporaneous adoption of a nationalstandard rule.”116 The author of the study, Professor Michael
Frakes of Cornell Law School, finds that in the context of
medical malpractice, “custom-based liability standards may
indeed encourage the perpetuation of customary practices and
likewise discourage deviations from custom . . . .”117 Professor
Frakes concludes that
the results of this study more generally suggest that a malpractice
rule that bases standards of care on customary physician practices
may indeed incentivize the perpetuation of those customary
practices and, at the same time, discourage deviations from
custom. . . .
The employment of custom-based standards, moreover, carries a
number of important policy implications, particularly with respect to
the possible role that they may play in discouraging cost-reducing
innovations in delivery practices. Legal scholars have long
recognized that the effectiveness of managed care and related
strategies may be blunted by a medical liability system that holds
physicians to a standard of care determined according to customary
physician practices, where those practices were developed in a
predominantly fee-for-service environment that may have
encouraged excessive practice styles.118

Professor Frakes goes on to state that,
[b]y arguably establishing the empirical relevancy of the customary
component to malpractice standards, this study validates these
concerns and thereby lends support to proposals that call for a
116

Michael Frakes, The Impact of Medical Liability Standards on Regional
Variations in Physician Behavior: Evidence from the Adoption of National-Standard
Rules 1 (Aug. 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
117
Id.
118
Id. at 37-38.
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relaxation of customary-standard requirements, including those that
argue for a stronger role for “reasonableness” in malpracticestandard determinations or, as above, a more definitive role for
clinical practice guidelines in malpractice proceedings.119

As is the case with the use of customary care standards
in medical malpractice litigation, the reliance on the customary
care proxy for quality in licensure proceedings and hospital
peer review is also likely to entrench custom-based decision
making at the cost of quality of care. This conclusion finds
support in several studies. First, a study was released in 2005
that demonstrated that physicians fail to provide simple, yet
essential, healthcare for common, serious conditions.120 Another
study, released in December of 2012, revealed that the
intervening seven years since the 2005 study have brought
little change in these failures, demonstrating that physicians
are surprisingly slow to adopt evidence-based care.121 In a
recent New Yorker article, quality-of-care expert and Harvard
Professor Atul Gawande noted that there is a disconcerting
fifteen-year average lag time in the adoption by physicians of
evidence-based practice choices.122 Another study released in
2010 demonstrated that the rate of injuries in hospitals from
physician errors remained unchanged in the ten years since the
IOM Report. This status quo exists in spite of multiple
initiatives to improve quality.123 Importantly, the study found
that “the penetration of evidence-based safety practices has been
quite modest. For example, . . . [c]ompliance with even simple
interventions such as hand washing is poor in many centers.”124
This article suggests that one reason for the failure of
evidence-based practices to penetrate into daily medical
practice may be the continued use of customary care as the

119

Id. at 38 (footnote omitted). The study done by Professor Frakes lends
empirical support for my arguments for a greater role for evidence based medicine, in
the form of Clinical Practice Guidelines, in the hospital peer review process made in
my 2006 article. See Van Tassel, supra note 3, at 1241-55.
120
Jha, supra note 22; see also supra notes 23-37 and accompanying text.
121
Kale et al., supra note 12.
122
Atul Gawande, Big Med, NEW YORKER (Aug. 12, 2012),
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/08/13/120813fa_fact_gawande; see also infra
note 162.
123
Christopher P. Landrigan et al., Temporal Trends in Rates of Patient Harm
Resulting from Medical Care, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2124, 2130 (2010) (“In a statewide
study of 10 North Carolina hospitals, we found that harm resulting from medical care
was common, with little evidence that rate of harm had decreased substantially over a 6year period ending in December 2007.”).
124
Id. at 2125.
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exclusive proxy for quality of care by the tort, licensure, and
hospital peer review systems.
B.

How Does the Conflict Between Evidence-Based
Medicine and Custom-Based Medicine Play Out in a
Malpractice Action?

An example of how the conflict between custom-based
and evidence-based medicine manifests itself in a medical
malpractice action occurs when a physician chooses whether to
use a stent to treat a patient who has blocked coronary arteries
and stable coronary heart disease.
It is part of customary practice to prop open blocked
arteries with a stent, a practice called percutaneous coronary
intervention or “PCI.”125 With PCI, a physician implants a mesh
tube into an artery to hold it open when it is narrowed by
accumulated plaque. This tube allows blood to flow more
freely.126 The total cost for the placement of a stent is between
30 and 50 thousand dollars and more than one million of these
procedures are performed every year.127 This means a total cost
to the healthcare system of between 30 to 50 billion dollars.128
In addition, there are risks associated with this procedure
which include the possibility of a heart attack, stroke, serious
allergic reactions, bleeding, and kidney damage.129 When these
risks are manifested, the cost to the system of this treatment
expands exponentially.
A recent meta-study of randomized trials published in
early 2012 (the 2012 Stent Study) demonstrates that an
inexpensive treatment with a handful of prescription drugs—a
mix of ACE inhibitors, statins, beta-blockers, and daily
aspirin—provides the same treatment benefits as stents for the

125

This is a procedure called percutaneous coronary intervention (or “PCI”) in which

a surgeon inserts a mesh tube made of metal into an artery that has become
narrowed by accumulated plaque. The [mesh] tube [is] threaded through an artery
in the leg or arm[.] [Then it] expands to hold the artery open at the point where
blood flow is restricted [by accumulated plaque].
Nicholas Bakalar, No Extra Benefits Are Seen in Stents for Coronary Artery Disease,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2012, at D7, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/28/
health/stents-show-no-extra-benefits-for-coronary-artery-disease.html.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id.
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prevention of chest pain, heart attacks, and death.130 The
authors of the study conclude that, “In the context of
controlling rising health care costs in the United States, this
study suggests that up to 76% of patients with stable CAD
[coronary artery disease] can avoid PCI [percutaneous coronary
intervention (such as stenting)] altogether if treated with
optimal medical therapy . . . .”131 Evidence-based medicine
would involve incorporating this meta-study into daily practice
choices and trying drug therapy before resorting to
implantation of a stent.
One of the authors of the study, Dr. David Brown of the
Stony Brook University Medical Center in New York, doubts
that this study will change the behavior of many physicians.132
He explains that,
In many hospitals, the cardiac service line generates 40 percent of
the total hospital revenue, so there’s incredible pressure to do more
procedures. . . . When you put in a stent, everyone is happy—the
hospital is making more money, the doctor is making more money—
everybody is happier except the health care system as a whole,
which is paying more money for no better results.133

The 2012 Stent Study provides an opportunity to
explain how the conflict between a custom-based medicine
treatment choice and an evidence-based treatment choice
might play out in a medical malpractice action. If a patient
with stable coronary heart disease dies as the result of the
insertion of a stent (for example, the surgery causes a heart
attack) and that patient was treated in one of the majority of
states where customary care is conclusive evidence of the
quality of care,134 that patient’s estate would be unlikely to
persuade a malpractice attorney to take the case in the first
instance. The duty of care is fairly consistent in most states,
130

Kathleen Stergiopoulus & David L. Brown, Less Is More: Initial Coronary
Stent Implantation with Medical Therapy vs Medical Therapy Alone for Stable
Coronary Artery Disease: Meta-Analysis of Randomized Controlled Trials, 172 ARCH.
INTERN. MED. 312, 312-18 (2012) (analysis included results on more than 7200 patients
enrolled in eight studies between 1997 and 2005 comparing stents with medical
therapy in stable heart patients with narrowed sections in their heart arteries). Over
half of those with stable coronary artery disease were implanted with stents before
they tried drug treatment. Julie Steenhuysen, Pills as Good as Stents for Some
Patients: Study, REUTERS (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/
02/28/us-pills-stents-idUSTRE81R24520120228.
131
Stergiopoulus & Brown, supra note 130, at 318.
132
Steenhuysen, supra note 130.
133
Bakalar, supra note 125.
134
See DOBBS, supra note 115, § 243, at 634-35.
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which is to provide the kind of care used by a reasonable
physician, who has like education, training, and expertise,
under the circumstances.135 Here, the issue is the kind of
treatment that a reasonable cardiologist would provide for a
person with stable coronary artery disease and a blocked
coronary artery.136 In a customary care state, the only relevant
evidence on this issue is evidence of what the customary
treatment by a cardiologist would be for a patient with this
condition.137 The evidence will show that the custom is to implant
a stent. The physician complied with the custom and, therefore,
did not breach the standard of care, even though the patient died.
Based on these facts, this case has little chance of success.
The 2012 Stent Study, described above, would not be
relevant and therefore would be inadmissible. The study could
not be admitted to show that the risks of stent implantation far
outweighed the benefits and that, therefore, it was
unreasonable to implant the stent. This study is not relevant
evidence in a customary care state because it does not help
answer the question of what constitutes customary care for
patients with stable coronary artery disease and blocked
coronary arteries. For this reason, the physician is rewarded by
the tort system for following the custom, even though evidencebased medical practice suggests a different treatment choice.
The situation changes dramatically if the cardiologist
did not place a stent and, instead, prescribed the far less
expensive, less risky, and equally effective treatment—using
medications to treat the patient—and the patient died of a
heart attack from a blocked artery. This physician, although
making the choice encouraged by evidence-based medical
practice, would not be able to use the 2012 Stent Study to
protect herself or himself from liability by showing that the
decision not to place the stent was reasonable. The study, once
again, would be inadmissible. Unlike the first scenario, where
it is unlikely that a plaintiff’s lawyer would even take the case
in the first place, a plaintiff’s lawyer would be likely to take
this case because the custom is to implant a stent and the
cardiologist did not do so. The plaintiff’s lawyer could easily
find an expert to testify that the custom is to implant a stent
and that, if the stent would have been implanted, the blockage
would have been bypassed and the patient would have been
135
136
137

Id.
Assuming there were no other confounding conditions.
See DOBBS, supra note 115, § 243, at 634-35.
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unlikely to have had a heart attack and died. While the
defendant physician will likely have an expert to testify that an
equally acceptable custom is to treat with medications,138 this
138

A brief note on the two schools of thought defense just to be sure that it is
clear that this affirmative defense does not ameliorate this conflict: One of the oft-cited
cases that describes the two schools of thought defense is the Pennsylvania case of
Jones v. Chidester, 610 A.2d 964 (Pa. 1992). As the court in Jones explains, under this
defense, if there are two approaches to treating a particular condition, one is chosen by
a majority of physicians and one that is followed by a “considerable number of
recognized and respected individuals,” the defendant physician will not be held liable
for adopting the treatment choice of this considerable minority. Id. at 969. There are
multiple reasons why this defense does not alter the conflict described by the stenting
hypothetical. First, there is a question regarding whether a particular state has
adopted this defense. Second, the relevance of the defense will depend on whether the
state has adopted the locality rule, the same or similar locality rule, or the national
rule. The defense will not be viable if the evidence-based treatment choice has not
garnered enough support to reflect the practice choice of a considerable minority in
either the same locality, the same community or a similar locality, or on a national
basis under the national rule, depending on which rule the state has adopted. Many
evidence-based treatment choices will initially be adopted only in large cities where
there are teaching hospitals. Thus, it will not be a practice choice of very many
physicians in the vast majority of communities that exist outside the large cities for a
considerable number of years, if at all. And, under the national rule, it will take a great
deal of time before the number of physicians who have adopted the evidence-based
treatment choice reaches a “considerable number” of physicians, especially if the state
adopts a proportionality test. In a recent New Yorker article, quality of care expert
Harvard Professor Atul Gawande noted that there is a disconcerting fifteen year average
lag time in the adoption by physicians of evidence-based practice choices. Gawande, supra
note 122; see also infra note 162.
Over and above this problem of relevance, it is important to note that this
is an affirmative defense as well as a question of fact. The physician will have to go to
trial as the applicability of this defense is a question of fact for the jury to decide. As
the physician is faced with going through the emotional turmoil and cost of an entire
trial, once again, the physician will be significantly deterred from adopting the
evidence-based practice choice. “[P]hysicians consistently report that they often engage
in defensive practices and that they feel intense pressure to do so out of fear of
becoming the subject of a malpractice suit.” Emily R. Carrier et al., Physicians’ Fear of
Malpractice Lawsuits Are Not Assuaged by Tort Reforms, 29 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1585,
1585 (2010) (citing David Studdert et al, Defensive Medicine and Tort Reform: A Wide
View, 25 J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 380, 380 (2010), and David Studdert et al., Defensive
Medicine Among High Risk Specialist Physicians in a Volatile Malpractice
Environment, 293 JAMA 2609, 2609 (2005)). “[I]ndividual physicians’ concerns about
their own malpractice risk are pervasive, vary across specialties in ways that are likely
to reflect underlying malpractice risk, and reflect objective measures of risk across
states to a limited degree.” Id. What stands out is that “the level of liability concern
reported by physicians is arguably out of step with the actual risk of experiencing a
malpractice claim.” Id. at 1591. One explanation is the common tendency for most to
over-estimate what are called “dread-risks,” which are rare but have devastating
outcomes. This tendency
relates to the well-documented human tendencies to overestimate the risk of rare
events and to be particularly fearful of risks that are unfamiliar, potentially
catastrophic, or difficult to control. Lawsuits are rare events in a physician’s career,
but physicians tend to overestimate the likelihood of experiencing them. . . . Severe,
unpredictable, uncontrollable events are associated with a feeling of dread that
triggers a statistically irrational level of risk aversion. . . . Physicians may be subject
to this phenomenon when it comes to malpractice suits. Because of the rarity of the
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“battle of the experts” is likely to create a reasonable question
of fact, and the case will be likely to survive a motion for
summary judgment and go to a jury. Thus, the physician will not
avoid litigation and will be “punished” for adopting evidencebased practice and failing to follow the custom in this case.
As the Frakes Study suggests, physicians are very
motivated to avoid litigation. Consequently, until the majority
of the states adopt the minority rule and allow the introduction
of risk-benefit analysis grounded in empirical science as
evidence of what is reasonable care under the circumstances,
the customary care rule will be a road block in the federal
government’s quest to transition away from custom-based
medical practice to evidence-based medical practice.
IV.

HOSPITAL PEER REVIEW

Private peer review is a self-policing system conducted
in hospitals where physicians informally evaluate each other
and report on those physicians who are allegedly failing to
provide quality patient care to hospital administration.139 If,
after an investigation and hearing conducted by the hospital,140
a physician is found to have provided poor quality of care, that
physician may be penalized in a variety of ways, including the
termination of the physician’s hospital staff privileges.141
suits, most physicians have little familiarity with them. The consequences of being
sued are perceived as potentially disastrous to one’s medical reputation,
psychological well-being, and financial stability. Finally, physicians tend to view
lawsuits as random events, unpredictable and uncontrollable, because they are not
viewed as related to the quality of care provided. These factors may lead to a fear of
suits that seems out of proportion to the actual risk of being sued.
Id.; see also David Studdert et al, Medical Malpractice, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 283
(2004); A.G. Lawthers, Physicians Perceptions of the Risk of Being Sued, 17 J. HEALTH
POL. POL’Y L. 463 (1992). Finally, the two schools of thought rule was developed to deal
with two different customs of care that existed in light of scientific uncertainty over
which choice was the most effective with the least associated risk. It should not be
relevant, as a public health matter, when there is a reasonable degree of scientific
certainty over treatment choice, especially if one treatment choice is especially risky or
just plain ineffective.
139
VIRGIL SLEE ET AL., SLEE’S HEALTHCARE TERMS 439 (5th ed. 2008). For a
detailed explanation of this process, see Van Tassel, supra note 3, at 1194-97.
140
Hospital peer review is conducted pursuant to the obligations of the
hospital medical staff to ensure “the quality of the professional services provided by
individuals with clinical privileges . . . .” JOINT COMM’N ON ACCREDITATION OF
HEALTHCARE ORGS., COMPREHENSIVE ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS: THE
OFFICIAL HANDBOOK, MS.1, at MS-2 (1999) [hereinafter CAMH].
141
CREDENTIALING AND PEER REVIEW PRACTICE GROUP OF THE AM. HEALTH
LAWYER’S ASS’N, PEER REVIEW GUIDEBOOK 60, MS-7 (3d ed. 2003) [hereinafter PEER
REVIEW GUIDEBOOK]; CAMH, supra note 140, at MS-7.
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In 1986, Congress passed the Health Care Quality
Improvement Act (HCQIA) in response to a perceived crisis
over the costs for insurance coverage for medical malpractice.142
HCQIA gave a Congressional stamp of approval to the hospital
peer review process by providing conditional immunity from
suit to those who participated in the process.143 After the
passage of HCQIA, the rate of hospital adoption of peer review
processes increased dramatically until today all of the nation’s
hospitals have adopted some form of peer review.
HCQIA also set up the National Practitioner Data Bank
(NPDB).144 Under the Act and its regulations, multiple different
organizations are required to report information involving
physicians that allegedly reflects the provision of poor quality
patient care. For example, insurance companies must report
malpractice payments and settlements on behalf of physicians
to the NPDB,145 state licensing boards must report disciplinary
actions to the NPDB,146 and healthcare providers147 must report

142

42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (2006). For a complete history of HCQIA, see
Katharine Van Tassel, Using Clinical Practice Guidelines and Knowledge Translation
Theory to Cure the Negative Impact of the Hospital Peer Review Hearing System on
Healthcare Quality, Cost and Access?, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 911 (2013).
143
Van Tassel, supra note 3, at 1194-97; see MICHAEL A. CASSIDY, IMMUNITY
FOR CREDENTIALING DECISIONS UNDER FEDERAL AND STATE LAW 38 (2003).
144
42 U.S.C. § 11101. The Health Resources and Services Administration
(HRSA) has “federal oversight responsibility for [the] NPDB.” U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, GAO-01-130, NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK: MAJOR IMPROVEMENTS
ARE NEEDED TO ENHANCE DATA BANK’S RELIABILITY 7 (2000) [hereinafter MAJOR
IMPROVEMENTS], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01130.pdf. HRSA
completed the regulations that established the operation of the NPDB in October of
1989. Id. While HRSA is responsible for ensuring compliance with these regulations,
the actual day-to-day operation of the NPDB is performed by a private operator. Id. In
2010, the list of healthcare professionals that the NPDB reports on was expanded from
just physicians and dentists to all healthcare practitioners by the passage of new
regulations. In addition, the list of entities that can query the NPDB has expanded to
include “private sector hospitals, nursing homes, and other organizations so that they
may be used when making employment, affiliation, certification, or licensure
decisions.” Legislation and Regulations: Why Is Section 1921 Important?, DATA BANK,
http://www.npdb-hipdb.hrsa.gov/resources/section1921.jsp (last visited Feb. 14, 2013).
Thus,
[h]ospitals and their human resource departments and nurse recruitment offices
now have access to licensure actions on all types of health care professionals. They
may query the Data Bank on all types of health care professionals including nurses,
nurse aides, and other allied health care professionals when making their hiring
decisions. The ability to perform pre-employment screenings of potential health care
employees is an invaluable resource that can enhance the hiring process and
increase an organization’s efforts towards patient safety.
Id.
145
146

42 U.S.C. § 11101.
Id.
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peer review actions to the NPDB that restrict a physician’s
clinical privileges for more than thirty days.148
Hospitals must also check the NPDB for negative
reports on each physician applying for staff privileges and must
check the NPDB for negative reports every two years for every
physician who already has staff privileges.149
A.

Hospital Peer Review Relies Upon Customary Care
Standards

Unfortunately, one of the main standards150 that hospital
peer review relies upon to measure physician competence
147

For example, hospitals and health plans. These new regulations bring the
states into the picture by requiring hospitals to send reports of all actions “that
adversely affect[] the clinical privileges of a physician or dentist for a period of longer
than 30 days,” 42 U.S.C. § 11133 (2000), to the state licensure board. The state licensure
boards are then required to report this information to the NPDB. National Practitioner
Data Bank for Adverse Information on Physicians and Other Health Care Practitioners:
Reporting on Adverse and Negative Actions, 75 Fed. Reg. 4677, § 60.5(d) (Jan. 28, 2010).
148
MAJOR IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 144, at 7. Even private professional
societies such as the American Dental Association and the American Medical
Association must report sanctions that impact membership. Id. Some federal agencies,
such as the VA, must report to the NPDB any negative actions that involve physicians
whom they insure, employ, or regulate. Id. at 7-8. Practitioners who are excluded from
participating in the Medicare and Medicaid Programs must also be reported if they either
default on federal loan agreements or engage in fraud or abuse. Id. at 8-9.
149
Id. at 9. There are also organizations which are allowed to query the
NPDB, such as professional societies and state licensure boards, but they are not
required to do so. Id. Individual physicians may only query for information about
themselves. Id.
150
The other major category of standards commonly used in hospital peer
review is one that expressly vests complete and unfettered discretion in decision
makers is one which gives a hospital’s governing body “the right to remove any member
of the medical staff or to deprive any physician or surgeon of the privileges of the
hospital whenever in their sole judgment the good of the hospital or the patients
therein may demand it.” N. Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Mizell, 148 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1962);
see also Tasher v. St. Tammany Parish Hosp., No. 87-1139, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1018, at *5 (E.D. La. 1988) (The executive committee had complete discretion to
summarily suspend privileges “whenever action must be taken immediately in the best
interest of patient care in the hospital”; this same broad standard was applied at the
post-deprivation hearing.). Also included in this category are those by-laws that are
less blatant but, in application, still call for a purely subjective determination. These
standards define the required level of competence as that which the decision makers
determine is the “best possible care,” Wyatt v. Tahoe Forest Hosp. Dist., 345 P.2d 93,
95 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (only physicians and surgeons who, in the judgment of the
board, would provide the “best possible care and professional skill” were granted staff
privileges); see also Duby v. Jordan Hosp., 341 N.E.2d 876, 880 (Mass. 1976) (hospital,
“in judging the [physician’s] professional competence[,] required that he give his
patients the ‘best possible care’”); Huffaker v. Bailey, 540 P.2d 1398, 1399 (Or. 1975)
(physician must provide to patients “a high quality of medical care”), or “adequate
medical care,” Koelling v. Bd. of Trs. of Mary Francis Skiff Mem’l Hosp., 146 N.W.2d
284, 296-97 (Iowa 1966) (failure to provide “adequate” medical care); see also Bock v.
John C. Lincoln Hosp., 702 P.2d 253, 255 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (physician’s staff
privileges were terminated because Executive Committee determined that the
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consists of the same customary care standards that many state
tort systems are starting to eschew based on concerns about
their impact on quality of care.151 As is the case with the use of
customary care standards in medical malpractice litigation, the
reliance on customary care in peer review acts to entrench
custom-based decision making at the cost of quality of care.
However, the hospital peer review system provides an even
stronger disincentive to the adoption of evidence-based
medicine than the other quality systems. As discussed more
fully in the next section, according to physicians, the
termination of staff privileges triggered by a negative peer
review report that is also filed with the NPDB can be a “career
ender” because it is highly unlikely, if not impossible, to obtain
staff privileges in another hospital or a new position that does
not require staff privileges thereafter.152

physician “failed to demonstrate to the Medical Committee that [he was] qualified to
practice as an Internal Medicine specialist.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), or
“high quality medical care,” Gaenslen v. Bd. of Dir. of St. Mary’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr.,
232 Cal. Rptr. 239, 242 (Ct. App. 1985) (standard that excluded physicians from staff
privileges who did not provide “high quality” care); Huffaker, 540 P.2d at 1399-401
(requirement that physicians provide a “high quality of medical care”). For a complete
explanation of why these standards supply few limitations on the discretion of the
decision makers which lead to a high risk of arbitrary and capricious decision making,
see Van Tassel, supra note 3, at 1197-1241.
151
Examples of the standards that fall into this category of customary care
include those which hold physicians to a standard of care as measured by the
“[hospital’s] standard of competence,” Adkins v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 544
N.E.2d 733, 736 (Ill. 1989) (physician’s treatment of patients failed to conform to “the
Center’s standard of competence”), or the “standard of the hospital or the medical
staff,” Campbell v. St. Mary’s Hosp., 252 N.W.2d 581, 588 (Minn. 1977) (corrective
action appropriate when “professional conduct of any member of the staff shall be
considered to be lower than the standard of the hospital or the medical staff”); see also
Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (Wash. 1974); DOBBS, supra note 115, § 242, at 633;
Rhee v. El Camino Hosp. Dist., 247 Cal. Rptr. 244, 246, 248-49 (Ct. App. 1988) (Newly
minted surgeon who had excellent credentials and training evaluations during his
residency ran afoul of a group of surgeons in the hospital where he started his practice.
Members of this group of physicians both served on the peer review panels charged
with judging whether the new surgeon met this in-house standard and testified that
the new surgeon “did not ‘meet the general standards of the surgical community at El
Camino Hospital . . . .’”).
152
See infra notes 153-63 and accompanying text; see also Sheree Lynn
McCall, A Hospital’s Liability for Denying, Suspending and Granting Staff Privileges,
32 BAYLOR L. REV. 175, 175 (1980) (“A physician’s livelihood is dependent on acquiring
and maintaining hospital staff privileges. The access to hospital facilities is necessary
for most physicians to adequately treat and care for patients, to maintain their medical
practice, and to pursue their medical career.”).
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Peer Review Sanctions Can Be a “Career Ender,”
Chilling the Adoption of Evidence-Based Medicine

The loss of hospital staff privileges in one hospital as
the result of a negative peer review report can mean the end of
a physician’s career.153 A good example is that of a surgeon. For
a surgeon, lack of access to hospital facilities to perform
surgeries, in effect, ends that physician’s career.154 The most
obvious situation where this will occur is when there is only
one hospital facility in the community.155 Loss of clinical
privileges at that sole hospital is likely to mean being barred
from the practice of medicine in that community.156
153

For a detailed discussion of the myriad problems with hospital peer review,
including its questionable constitutionality, see generally Katharine Van Tassel,
Blacklisted: The Constitutionality of the Federal System for Publishing Reports of
“BAD” Doctors in the National Practitioner Data Bank, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 2031
(2012); McCall, supra note 152, at 175; Note, The Physician’s Right to Hospital Staff
Membership: The Public-Private Dichotomy, 1966 WASH. U. L.Q. 485, 510-11
(concluding a successful doctor must have access to hospitals).
154
See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: HORNBOOK SERIES § 7-1, 374
(2000) (explaining that precondition to the practice of medicine is access to hospitals).
155
Kiracofe v. Reid Mem’l Hosp., 461 N.E.2d 1134, 1142 (Ind. 1984) (noting
that when a hospital is the only one in a community, “its economic impact is great, and
the denial of hospital privileges, in many cases, is tantamount to denying a physician
the opportunity to practice his or her chosen profession”). In Greisman v. Newcomb
Hosp., 192 A.2d 817, 824 (N.J. 1963), the court described the situation as follows:
The Newcomb Hospital is the only hospital in the Vineland metropolitan area and it
is publicly dedicated, primarily to the care of the sick and injured of Vineland and its
vicinity . . . . Doctors need hospital facilities and a physician practicing in the
metropolitan Vineland area will understandably seek them at the Newcomb
Hospital. Furthermore, every patient of his will want the Newcomb Hospital
facilities to be readily available. It hardly suffices to say that the patient could enter
the hospital under the care of a member of the existing staff, for his personal
physician would have no opportunity of participating in his treatment; nor does it
suffice to say that there are other hospitals outside the metropolitan Vineland area,
for they may be too distant or unsuitable to his needs and desires. All this indicates
very pointedly that, while the managing officials may have discretionary powers in
the selection of the medical staff, those powers are deeply imbedded in public
aspects, and are rightly viewed, for policy reasons . . . as fiduciary powers to be
exercised reasonably and for the public good.
Id.
156

Kiracofe, 461 N.E.2d at 1142; Greisman, 192 A.2d at 824. What many seem
to lose sight of is that a physician’s inability to practice has a ripple effect—when a
physician can no longer practice medicine, all of that physician’s patients lose access to
healthcare. This situation could impact hundreds of people. The loss of their physician
is especially hard on those who are dependent on Medicaid and Medicare; it could be
years before they are able to find a new physician willing to take on new Medicaid or
Medicare patients. One in three physicians are currently turning away new Medicaid
patients. Robert Lowes, Almost 1 in 3 Physicians Turn Away New Medicaid Patients,
MEDSCAPE MED. NEWS (Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/768763.
This situation will grow exponentially worse as the physician shortage grows and
millions of new ACA patients and aging baby boomers flood the system.
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While taking a bit more time to occur, an adverse peer
review finding will ultimately impact the physician who
practices in a very large community with multiple hospitals in
the same disastrous way. When the hospitals perform their
mandatory check of the NPDB for physicians applying for staff
privileges for the first time, or their biennial check for
physicians already on staff, the negative report will become
known.157 A termination or limitation of staff privileges at one
hospital is likely to trigger a second hospital to follow suit to
avoid placing itself at risk of being sued for negligent
credentialing.158 A national survey revealed that in 2007 alone,
48,075 licensure, credentialing, or membership decisions were
impacted by NPDB reports.159
Dr. Edward Dench, Jr., former President of the
Pennsylvania Medical Society, opines that a data bank report
157

See supra note 149.
In a GAO Report on the problems with the accuracy of the data contained
in the NPDB, the agency acknowledged that the information contained in the databank
“can affect a practitioner’s reputation and livelihood.” MAJOR IMPROVEMENTS, supra
note 144, at 3. A HRSA survey revealed that NPDB users, including credentialing
committees, chiefs of the medical staff, department chairs and the chief executive
officers, found the reports to be an important part of the credentialing process. Teresa
Waters et al., The Role of the National Practitioner Data Bank in the Credentialing
Process, AM. J. MED. QUALITY 34 (2006).
159
ALAN LEVINE & SIDNEY WOLFE, HOSPITALS DROP THE BALL ON PHYSICIAN
OVERSIGHT 6 & n.7 (2009), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/18731.pdf.
The Levine Report reached this conclusion using data from TERESA WATERS ET AL.,
NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK USER AND NON-USER SURVEY FINAL REPORT 169
tbl.IV.C.94 (Apr. 2001). The authors of the Levine Report explained that they reached
this conclusion based on Waters’s
158

survey question which was “Would your decision regarding the practitioner have
been different if you had not received the NPDB response.” 9.04 percent of the
responses answered “yes.” Applying this percentage to the 531,802 matches for 2007
results in an estimated 48,075 decisions that were affected by an NPDB report.
LEVINE & WOLFE, supra, at 6 n.7.
Adding to the cascade of negative effects a physician faces from a negative peer
review report is the loss of both medical insurance and the termination of managed
care contracts. In most states, a physician cannot practice without liability
insurance. . . . And the loss of managed care contracts alone can destroy a
physician’s practice, even without all of the other negative consequences of being
blacklisted. The amazing growth of managed care compels the participation of
almost all health care providers in managed care contracts. Physicians who are not
part of a practice group with managed care contracts, or who are not preferred
providers with multiple managed care organizations, have a difficult time
maintaining a practice. In order to be considered for, or maintain, these contracts,
health care providers must work to stay in good standing with these managed care
organizations. Physicians who lose hospital staff privileges for quality of care
reasons are highly likely to face the immediate termination of managed care
contracts.
Van Tassel, supra note 153, at 2061-62 (footnote omitted).
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“can essentially make you unemployable, and it can be the
difference between getting insurance and not getting
insurance.”160 A far-reaching and comprehensive study
commissioned by the State of California into the reasons for the
low and declining level of reporting of negative peer review
actions to the NPDB supports Dr. Dench’s claim, revealing that
physicians who have been the subject of [a negative peer review
action] state that it is difficult or impossible to find a new position,
their professional lives are ruined, other entities will not grant
privileges even if they have fulfilled the terms of the discipline, and
they spend years and hundreds of thousands of dollars in court
trying to clear their professional names and reputations.
....
. . . Physicians who had experienced [having a negative peer review
report state that it] . . . was a “career ender.”161

Thus, like the tort and licensure systems, the threat of a
hospital peer review action provides a powerful disincentive to
switching from custom-based to evidence-based practice.
Arguably, the hospital peer review system, with its careerending potential, is an even greater obstacle to this conversion.
V.

SOLUTIONS

The solution to this disconnect between the ACA and
the other three systems for improving healthcare quality, cost,
and access involves both top-down and bottom-up strategies. In
the context of the tort and licensure systems, the solution is a
top-down one because it requires action on the part of state
legislatures or court systems. It is up to legislators or judges to
change the scope of the admissible evidence in medical
malpractice and licensure cases, either by statute or case law,
to allow risk–benefit analysis based on empirical evidence to
become admissible on the issue of the standard of care.
160

Steve Twedt, A Negative Data Bank Listing Isn’t Easy to Erase,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Oct. 27, 2003), http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/
03300/234532.stm.
161
LUMETRA, COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF PEER REVIEW IN CALIFORNIA: FINAL
REPORT 65, 94 (2008) (citation omitted), available at http://www.mbc.ca.gov/
publications/peer_review.pdf (Physicians with negative peer review reports “described
not being able to find any position or job after having [a negative] report filed and
spending three to five years in [peer review] hearings and other procedures to fight for
their reputations, even after the [licensure board] found no wrongdoing on their part.
They reported spending thousands of dollars to fight the charges so they could again
practice as physicians.”).
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On the other hand, the solution is a bottom-up one when
it comes to hospital peer review. Of course, because rational
physicians are likely to balk at adopting evidence-based
treatment choices if it will result in a lawsuit, the laws that
make custom the exclusive proxy for quality must first be
changed as explained above.
Next, as described below, regulations under the ACA
should be formulated to allow for the integration of evidencebased medicine into hospital practice. To date, efforts to
integrate evidence-based treatment choices into physician
practice have met with little success. Scores of studies have
revealed that physicians are being exposed to evidence-based
medicine in the form of clinical practice guidelines (CPGs) on a
regular basis—they go to seminars, listen, agree, then go back
to practice and ignore the new information.162 The disconnect
that these studies evince is a well-studied problem of
translating knowledge into action.

162

See, e.g., Lee A. Green & Colleen M. Seifert, Translation of Research into
Practice: Why We Can’t “Just Do It,” J. AM. BD. FAM. PRAC. 541, 541 (2004) (There is
“widespread agreement that physicians and healthcare systems simply do not put new
knowledge about how to improve our patients’ outcomes into practice nearly quickly
enough. . . . For example, consider the guideline that ‘congestive heart failure patients
should be evaluated for use of beta-blockers.’ An expert physician may be aware of this
recommendation and may wholeheartedly accept it as good practice, but may still fail
to adopt it when they happen to see an elderly patient in the clinic who could benefit
from beta-blockade. Knowledge of evidence can remain separate from, and not
integrated into, the physician’s extensive database of procedures that guides their
decision and actions. This makes the likelihood of recognizing that the new knowledge
is appropriate and incorporating it into these well-rehearsed procedures very
uncertain.”); Illaria Baiardini et al., Why Do Doctors and Patients Not Follow
Guidelines, 9 CURR. OPIN. ALLERGY CLIN. IMMUNOL. 228, 228 (2009) (“During the last
few years, different studies and theories have tried to explain the reason why doctors
and patients do not follow guidelines. . . . [A]lthough the effort made to develop and
divulge evidenced-based guidelines, results of studies conducted in the United States
and the Netherlands suggest that most of the time, guidelines are not applied[;] about
30-40% of patients do not benefit from a cure programme based on scientific evidence,
whereas 20-25% of therapeutic choices may be unnecessary and sometimes even
harmful.”); Michael D. Cabana et al., Why Don’t Physicians Follow Clinical Practice
Guidelines?, 282 JAMA 1458, 1458 (1999) (“Despite wide promulgation, [clinical
practice] guidelines have had limited effect on changing physician behavior.”); Justin
W. Timbie et al., Five Reasons that Many Comparative Effectiveness Studies Fail to
Change Patient Care and Clinical Practice, 31 HEALTH AFFAIRS 2168, 2168 (2012)
(“[D]ecades of experience suggest that translating evidence into changes in clinical
practice is rarely rapid . . . .”); David A. Davis et al., Translating Guidelines Into
Practice: A Systematic Review of Theoretic Concepts, Practical Experience and Research
Evidence in the Adopting of Clinical Practice Guidelines, 15 CAN. MED. ASS’N 408, 408
(1997) (“The evidence shows serious deficiencies in the adoption of CPGs in practice.”).
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Translating Knowledge into Action

Behavioral scientists have developed a large body of
empirical research on how to effectively put knowledge into action,
which has resulted in the creation of what many call “knowledge
translation theory” or “research implementation theory.”163
Knowledge translation theory teaches that there are seven action
phases that are key to translating knowledge into action:
[1] specific identification of the problem;
[2] identifying, reviewing, and selecting the knowledge to implement;
[3] adapting or customizing the knowledge to the local context;
[4] assessing the determinants of knowledge use;
[5] selecting, tailoring, implementing, and monitoring knowledge
translation interventions and knowledge uptake;
[6] evaluating outcomes or impact of using the knowledge; and
[7] determining strategies for ensuring sustained knowledge use.164

These seven action steps can occur in seriatim. In
addition, it is important to note that these knowledge steps can
change the action phases at any point in the sequence.165 “The
action parts of the cycle are based on planned action theories that
focus on deliberately engineering change in health care systems
and groups.”166 An important part of the theory is to actively
consider the particular circumstances of the physicians who are
the end users of the knowledge that is being assimilated.167
The solution that this article proposes is the use of
knowledge translation theory to integrate knowledge about
effective treatment choices that have been developed through
empirical science into daily physician practice. The empirically
based knowledge that this proposal focuses on is the use of best
practices based upon evidence-based guidelines called clinical
practice guidelines (CPGs) to guide treatment choices.168 CPGs
163

Sharon E. Straus et al., Knowledge Translation Is the Use of Knowledge in
Health Care Decision Making, 64 J. CLIN. EPI. 6, 6-10 (Jan. 2011).
164
Id. at 9.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
CPGs are “systematically developed statements to assist practitioner and
patient decisions about appropriate health care for specific clinical circumstances.”
INST. OF MED., CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES: DIRECTIONS FOR A NEW PROGRAM 8
(Marilyn Field & Kathleen N. Lohr eds., 1990).
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identify optimum treatment choices that are derived from
clinical outcomes and effectiveness research.169 CPGs reflect the
“well-considered opinions of expert panels, based upon reviews
of the best available data, as to how physicians should
approach certain clinical problems.”170 The use of CPGs to guide
clinical decision making will improve quality of care by the use
of what are called “best practices”171 and will decrease costs
through the use of less costly choices that result in the same or
better outcomes as higher-cost alternatives.172
1. Applying Steps One Through Three of Knowledge
Translation Theory
In order to specifically identify an initial set of CPGs
that are appropriate to adopt into a particular practice context,
the set of physicians who make up a specific practice group
within a hospital should set up a working committee. The
ultimate task of this working committee will be to propose to
the entire practice group a set of CPGs that has been modified
to fit the clinical care expectations of the practice group as a
whole. An example would be a working committee of the
cardiology practice group of a hospital which would likely start
169

Id. at 6.
Richard E. Leahy, Rational Health Policy and the Legal Standard of Care:
A Call for Judicial Deference to Medical Practice guidelines, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1483,
1506 (1989).
171
Arnold J. Rosoff, The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Health Care
Reform, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 369, 390-91, 394 (1995); KIRK B. JOHNSON ET AL., AM. MED.
ASS’N, LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF PRACTICE PARAMETERS 1 (1990) (referring to CPGs as
“practice parameters” to guide physicians in “deliver[ing] high quality medical care in a
fashion that is effective and efficient, thereby enabling the profession to respond to
society’s need to assure appropriate utilization of health care services and to control
health care expenditures without sacrificing quality of care.”); PHYSICIAN PAYMENT
REVIEW COMM’N, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 219-20 & n.1 (recommending
federal support for outcome research and creation of practice guidelines based thereon);
see also generally Robert H. Brook et al., Predicting the Appropriate Use of Carotid
Endarterectomy, Upper Gastrointestinal Endoscopy, and Coronary Angiography, 323
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1173, 1173 (1990); David M. Eddy, Clinical Decision Making: From
Theory to Practice, 263 JAMA 287, 287 (1990) (explaining the challenge that led to the
best practices initiatives); Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines for Medical Care:
The Policy Rationale, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 777 (1990); Eleanor D. Kinney & Marilyn D.
Wilder, Medical Standard Setting in the Current Malpractice Environment: Problems
and Possibilities, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 421, 424-27 (1989); Leahy, supra note 170;
William L. Roper et al., Effectiveness in Health Care: An Initiative to Evaluate and
Improve Health Care, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1197, 1198 (1988) (describing what will
later be labeled as a “best practices” initiative as an “effectiveness initiative” on the
part of the Health Care Financing Administration); Steve Berman et al., Foreword, in
Symposium, Getting It Right: The Makings of Practice Guidelines, 16 QUALITY REV.
BULL., Feb. 1990, at 40.
172
Rosoff, supra note 171, at 370.
170
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with the CPGs promulgated by the American College of
Cardiology (ACC).173 The CPG working committee would first
evaluate these CPGs,174 taking into consideration the
suggestions of the entire practice group regarding modification
of these CPGs to fit the collective practice style and
professional judgments of all of the physicians in the practice
group. The process of soliciting modifications will include
educating the entire group regarding the merits (the strength
of the science and the impact on quality) of each CPG at issue.
Once these group suggestions are integrated into the CPGs, the
working committee will then recommend them to the entire
group for adoption.175
173

There are two main questions which a CPG committee should investigate
when choosing the appropriate CPGs. First, who created the CPGs? And second, what
scientific methods were used in the creation of the CPG? It is advisable for physicians
to rely upon CPGs created by groups with “auspice legitimacy”—in other words, those
developers with excellent reputations for accuracy and technical expertise. Id. at 38485. These are most likely to be large national groups which represent practice
specialties, such as the ACC or the American Heart Association. It is also
recommended that physicians avoid CPGs promulgated by payors, referred to by some
as “boundary guidelines.” Boundary guidelines “are used by payors to define a range of
practice options within which physicians could act without incurring financial or other
sanctions.” Havighurst, supra note 171, at 778 n.3 (citing L. LEWIN & J.E. ERIKSON,
LEADERSHIP IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRACTICE GUIDELINES: THE ROLE OF THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND OTHERS 3 (rev. ed. 1989) (prepared for the Physician
Payment Review Commission’s Conference on Practice Guidelines, Washington, D.C.,
Oct. 11, 1988)). These CPGs are based on cost/benefit choices motivated by profit. CPGs
that call for the provision of less care could increase the risk of malpractice exposure.
174
In addition, the CPG committee must evaluate the scientific basis for the
CPG in great detail. Was the patient population that made up the clinical practice data
base sufficiently large? Were the results grounded on well-accepted scientific outcomes
research? Were the methodologies used appropriate for the context and were they used
under the guidance of qualified medical professionals? If any of these questions are
answered in the negative, the CPG should be avoided. On the other hand, if the CPG
was created to optimize quality of care by competent scientists based on careful
analysis of an appropriately large data base and the results were controlled for
confounding, bias and probability issues, the CPG could be a candidate for adoption
taking into consideration the nature of the specific practice. Rosoff, supra note 171, at
384-86, 388, 390.
175
The amount of time, duplication of effort, and expense associated with this
CPG review enterprise is a legitimate criticism of this proposal. One solution to these
concerns is to follow the lead of the institutional review boards (IRBs) of medical institutions
which conduct multicenter trials during clinical investigations of drugs and devices.
[S]ometimes the IRB at each center of a multicenter trial conducts a complete
review of the protocol and informed consent. Such multiple reviews by multiple
IRBs can result in unnecessary duplication of effort, delays, and increased expenses
in the conduct of multicenter clinical trials. Greater reliance on a centralized IRB
review process, in appropriate circumstances, could reduce IRB burdens and delays
in the conduct of multicenter trials.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY USING A CENTRALIZED IRE
REVIEW PROCESS IN MULTICENTER CLINICAL TRIALS (Mar. 2006), at Part II,
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm127013.pdf. For
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Thus, steps one through three of knowledge translation
theory will have been applied: this initial committee will have
specifically identified the problem (the particular instances of
conflict between treatment choices suggested by customary
practice versus evidence-based practice), will have identified,
reviewed, and selected the knowledge to implement (which
CPGs to adopt), and will have adapted or customized the
knowledge (the CPG) to the local context.
2. Applying Steps Four Through Seven of Knowledge
Translation Theory
Once the adoption of the initial set of CPGs has been
completed, a CPG committee would be appointed on a yearly
basis which could review and update the guidelines. Whenever
ACC (or another appropriate group that has auspice
authenticity176) distributes new CPG provisions or revisions of
existing
CPGs,
the
CPG
committee
could
make
recommendations to the cardiology practice group for adoption
(with or without revision) or rejection.
Once the CPGs are adopted by the practice group, each
physician who is a member of that department will be expected
to comply with the CPGs except in situations where, in the
judgment of the physician, they are not appropriate.177 In those
example, central IRBs have been created to review multicenter trials dealing with a
particular type of condition. “[T]he National Cancer Institute . . . has created a
freestanding central IRB . . . to provide the option for centralized IRB review for the
many multicenter cancer trials conducted by NCI.” Id. at Part VII.B. Similarly, CPG
committees with comparable practice specialties could contract with a centralized CPG
review group to perform a continuous review of CPGs to reflect scientific developments.
The recommendations of this centralized CPG group could then be submitted to the
CPG committee of the local institution for adoption, adoption with modification, or
rejection. This pooling of resources is one way to deal with the concerns of duplication
of effort, delay, and expense.
176
See Rosoff, supra note 171, at 384-95.
177
As Professor Rosoff explains:
The goal of . . . CPGs is not, despite what some physicians may believe, to remove all
elements of discretion and professional judgment from medical care. There will
always be the need and, one would hope, the latitude-for the exercise of professional
judgment. Still, as the body of what is knowable and what is known grows, the
degree of latitude will inevitably be impacted by the extant knowledge base. When
one does not know what is right or wrong, everything is fair game to do. Knowledge
brings limitations, or at least, the basis for limitations to be imposed. As an Institute
of Medicine committee on Practice Guidelines has stated, the formal recognition of
the practice guidelines movement “can be seen as part of a significant cultural shift,
a move away from unexamined reliance on professional judgment toward more
structured support and accountability for such judgment.
Id. at 375.
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circumstances, the physician will be expected to engage in
documentation of the reasons for deviating from the CPGs. A
physician who fails to comply with the CPGs without a welldocumented rationale should be subject to corrective action.
This process fits with the paternalistic libertarian
theory advanced by Harvard Professor Cass Sunstein and
University of Chicago Professor Richard Thaler, which starts
with a default position based upon empirical evidence of best
practices but then allows for individual choice in deviating
from this default if it is reasonable to do so.178 What this system
does not allow for is an irrational choice or an “unthinking”
choice to deviate from the norm without careful consideration.
Just as with crossing a street, when a reasonable person should
“stop, look, and listen,” the CPGs ask physicians to stop, think,
and make a rational choice to accept or reject the CPG. Then,
these physicians must document their reason for a choice to reject
the CPG, which creates data for review by risk management.
In the area of scientific uncertainty, where one size does
not fit all and the art of medicine must come into play, the
paternalistic libertarian model works well. It allows for a
starting point in the decision-making tree that is based on
empirical data for the treatment of “norm,” with the freedom to
make a different choice if reasonable.
To keep the CPGs from falling behind current best
practices, the cardiology CPG committee should perform
updates on an ongoing basis to keep pace with scientific
developments. The CPGs adopted by the cardiology practice
group would then become the practice norm for all of the
cardiology practice group’s physicians. Data should be gathered
by the risk management department on the actual
implementation of the CPGs. If a CPG was not followed,
178

Cass Sunstein & Richard Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1159 (2003).
The idea of libertarian paternalism might seem to be an oxymoron, but it is both
possible and legitimate for private and public institutions to affect behavior while
also respecting freedom of choice. Often people’s preferences are ill-formed, and their
choices will inevitably be influenced by default rules, framing effects, and starting
points. In these circumstances, a form of paternalism cannot be avoided. Equipped
with an understanding of behavioral findings of bounded rationality and bounded
self control, libertarian paternalists should attempt to steer people’s choices in
welfare promoting directions without eliminating freedom of choice. It is also
possible to show how a libertarian paternalist might select among the possible
options and to assess how much choice to offer. Examples are given from many
areas, including savings behavior, labor law, and consumer protection.
Id.
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collecting information on the reasons why the CPG was not
followed will allow for further modifications to fit the needs of
the practice and its patients. Fine tuning the CPG in this way
will improve adherence to the CPG.
Thus, steps four through seven of knowledge translation
theory will have been applied. Pursuant to step four, a
continuous assessment will be made by risk management of the
determinants of knowledge use (when the CPGs have been
followed or not, and why). Pursuant to step five, if further
education regarding the CPGs is needed, problem solving can
be done and strategies for teaching can be created by the
cardiology CPG committee in conjunction with risk
management. Thus, a continuing assessment of the success in
implementing the CPGs and their impact on healthcare quality
and cost can be made, fulfilling the requirements of steps six
through seven for translating knowledge into action.
3. A Working Example of the Application of Knowledge
Translation Theory
The prescription of aspirin after a heart attack provides
a simple example of how this process will work. Scientific
studies have long established that providing aspirin to a
patient within twenty-four hours of a heart attack may
increase that patient’s chances of survival by thirty percent.179
Yet fifty percent of physicians in hospitals across the country
are failing to provide this simple, lifesaving treatment.180 Under
this proposal, the CPG committees of all of the hospital
cardiology departments across the country should propose that
the CPG of the American College of Cardiology181 recommending
this treatment be adopted as an expectation of performance of
the medical staff of each hospital’s cardiology department.
To provide an example of how the exception to following
the CPG would work, if this CPG on aspirin treatment for
heart attack victims has been adopted and a heart attack
patient is admitted to the hospital with a condition that
contradicts the provision of this treatment, the physician must
document this fact. Otherwise, the failure to provide the
179

Fessenden, supra note 23.
Van Tassel, supra note 3, at 1245.
181
The ACC/AHA Guidelines for the Management of Patients with Acute
Myocardial Infarction, and updates to the guidelines, are published in the Journal of the
American College of Cardiology, 28 AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 1328, 1374-76 (1996); 34 AM. C.
CARDIOLOGY 890, 890-911 (1999) (updates), available at http://coment.onlinejacc.org/.
180
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treatment will violate the performance expectation as set forth
in the adopted CPG. This documentation exception should
avoid a rigid expectation that the CPG be followed in all
circumstances. It recognizes that patient care does not always
follow the norm and allows for flexibility to adjust to a patient’s
unique needs.
This exception also allows for the high level of scientific
uncertainty that exists currently when it comes to many
medical conditions, particularly in the realm of the treatment
of outliers. As the practice of evidence-based medicine (also
known as population-based medicine or the treatment of
“norm”) grows through the greater understanding of optimal
treatment choices through big data techniques to establish
comparative
effectiveness—and
later
transitions
to
personalized medicine based on the treatment of individuals
according to their unique genetic profiles—the currently high
degree of scientific uncertainly will steadily diminish and
reduce the use of this exception.
This committee system will allow for physician choice
among CPGs182 which will then suggest treatment choices based
on best outcomes derived from empirical studies.183 An example of
how this is already being done is the integrated practice model
adopted by the Mayo Clinic184 and the VA Hospital System.185
CONCLUSION
As pointed out in this article, a large and rapidly
growing group of empirical studies suggests that the current
normative practice of custom-based medicine in the United
States has a negative impact on the quality and cost of
healthcare. The quality and cost problems with the customary
care model have led to a national push to move the United

182

Clinical Practice Guidelines are based on empirical data generated by
clinical outcomes and effectiveness research which suggests the optimum treatment for
a rapidly growing number of clinical conditions. Leahy, supra note 170, at 1506.
183
Id. This use of empirical data generated through scientific methodology to
make medical decisions shows great promise for enhancing quality of care while
decreasing the cost of care. Van Tassel, supra note 3, at 1245.
184
See DOUGLAS MCCARTHY ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, PUB. NO. 1306,
MAYO CLINIC: MULTIDISCIPLINARY TEAMWORK, PHYSICIAN-LED GOVERNANCE, AND
PATIENT-CENTERED CULTURE DRIVE WORLD-CLASS HEALTH CARE 13 (2009), available at
http://www.commonwealth.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Case%20Study/2009/Aug/1306
_McCarthy_Mayo_case%20study.pdf (describing the structural and cultural pillars
undergirding the Mayo Clinic’s integrated model of health care delivery).
185
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.

928

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:3

States to a modern, evidence-based model of medical practice
through major changes in government-provided healthcare.
However, the three main systems already in place for
improving healthcare in the United States are encouraging the
perpetuation of custom-based practices undermining the
national efforts to improve the quality and cost of healthcare
through the practice of evidence-based treatment choices. This
article’s specific suggestions for how these systems can be
modified to work in tandem with federal law will encourage
physicians to adopt the evidence-based model of medical practice
in order to improve healthcare quality, cost, and access.

